Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

7

NYAYA KULISA

॥ न्याय कुलिशः ॥

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

ıamalai University Philosophy Series—1.

NYĀYAKULIŚA

OR

The Lightning-Shaft of Reason

BY

ĀTREYA RĀMĀNUJA

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

Annamalai University Philosophy Series—1.

THE ACADEMY OF SANSKRIT RESEAR
MELKOTE-[illegible]431.
(KARNATAKA STATE)

NYĀYAKULIŚA

Accn. No. 12902

OR

The Lightning-Shaft of Reason

BY

ĀTREYA RĀMĀNUJA

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

R. RAMANUJACHARI, M.A.,
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, ANNAMALAI UNIVERSITY,

AND

PANDIT K. SRINIVASACHARYA, SIROMANI,
SANSKRIT DEPARTMENT, ANNAMALAI UNIVERSITY.

1938

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

॥ श्रीः ॥

॥ न्यायकुलिशम् ॥

वादिहंसाम्बुवाहापरनामकात्रेयरामानुजार्यविरचितम्

सम्पादकौ—

र. रामानुजाचार्यः

क. श्रीनिवासाचार्यः

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

DEDICATED

TO

The Right Hon'ble V. S. SRINIVASA SASTRI, P.C., C.H., LL.D.,

VICE-CHANCELLOR, ANNAMALAI UNIVERSITY

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

CONTENTS

Preface	i
Foreword	iii
Introduction—Life and Work of the Author	v-vii
„ Argument	vii-xxxiv
Bhūmikā	1-28
Viṣayānukramaṇikā	29-39
Text	१--९१८
Index of Kārikās in Nyāyakuliśa	199
„ „ in Kaivalyavicāra	208
„ „ Quoted	209
Index of Books Mentioned	209
Index of Authors Referred to	210
Errata	211-212

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

PREFACE

In preparing the text of *Nyāyakuliśa* for the press the following manuscripts have been collated.

1. R. No. 3290. Paper. Grantha script. 12 Vādas
2. R. No. 4910. Devanagari script. 12 Vādas

Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras.

3. 36 A. 4. Grantha script pp. 368 — *Manuscripts Library, Adyar.*
4. A. 355. Telugu script. pp. 75. 8 Vādas only
5. 3727 Grantha script pp. 107. 8 Vādas only

Mysore Manuscripts Library.

6. A palm-leaf MS. in Grantha script kindly supplied to us by Mr. D. T. Tatachariar, Principal, Śrī Venkateśwara Sanskrit College, Tirupati.
7. A MS. in Telugu script obtained from Nellore.
8. A transcript made for the use of His Holiness Paramahamsa Parivrājaka Srinivasa Mahā Deśika.

Suggestions for filling up the many lacunae in the text have been made in square brackets; and suggestions of better readings have been given in round brackets.

His Holiness Paramahamsa Parivrājaka Rangarāmānuja swami, Tarkārṇava T. Viraraghavachariar, Professor of Nyāya, Śrī Venkateśwara Sanskrit College, Tirupati, Panditarāja D. T. Tatachariar, M.O.L., Principal, Śrī Venkateśwara Sanskrit College and Mr. T. E. Viraragavachariar, Professor, Rājāh's College of Sanskrit and Tamil Studies, Trivadi have throughout taken a very kindly interest in this work and helped us in manifold ways. To them we express our deepest sense of gratitude. We acknowledge also the very great debt we owe to Mahāmahopādhyāya Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastriar, M.A., I.E.S. (Retd), for the facilities he gave us for consulting the manuscripts lodged in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, for the helpful suggestions given to us from time to time and for his kindness in writing a Foreword to this book. Our sincere thanks are due to Professors M. R. Rajagopala Aiyangar, M.A., L.T., and K. R. Applachariar, M.A.,L.T., for having read the Introduction and made valuable sugges-

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

tions. Our grateful thanks are due also to Dr. B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, Editor of the Annamalai University Research Journal for the helpful interest he evinced in the publication of this treatise in the Journal.

We cannot adequately thank the Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar, P.C., C.H., LL.D., Vice-Chancellor of the Annamalai University, for the kind permission he gave us for editing this work.

Annamalainagar,
November 18, 1938.

R. R.
K. S.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

FOREWORD

By

Mahāmahopādhyāya Vidyāvācaspati

Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar, M.A., I.E.S. (Retired).

The *Nyāyakuliśa* is a rare, authoritative and scholarly handbook of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta. Its author, Śrī Ātreya Rāmānuja, otherwise known as Vādihamsāmbuvāha, was the maternal uncle and teacher of Śrī Vedānta Deśika, who flourished in the last quarter of the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth century A.D. If Bhagavad Rāmānuja is the leading exponent of the Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrine and the great Bhāṣyakāra of the Vedānta-darśana in the Viśiṣṭādvaita setting and if the credit of preparing his way belongs to Bhagavad Yāmunācārya, it may be said that, in a closely similar manner, Śrī Vedānta Deśika stands out as the greatest champion of Viśiṣṭādvaita polemics and Śrī Deśika's mainstay in his polemics is the unfailing *Lightning-shaft of dialectic,* which his elder contemporary and teacher, Śrī Ātreya Rāmānuja, has provided in the *Nyāyakuliśa.*

Any systematic study of Vedāntic thought would be impossible without a comparative study of at least the three chief schools of Vedānta —Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita. The *Nyāyakuliśa* is very useful for this purpose. This treatise discusses the chief tenets of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school under thirteen dialectic heads, in a polemical style. The incisive logic of the author's criticisms, particularly where he deals with the views of the Advaita school, is admirable and compels a very respectful consideration.

This important and valuable treatise was hitherto known only through a few manuscripts here and there. The credit of bringing out a reliable and carefully prepared edition of this rare Viśiṣṭādvaita manual, for the first time, belongs to my learned colleagues—Pandit K. Srinivasachariar of the Sanskrit Department and Professor R. Ramanujachariar of the Philosophy Department, Annamalai University; and the world of scholars and all interested in Indian culture ought to feel grateful to the learned editors for the substantial contribution they have made to the study and appreciation of the Vedānta, by bringing out a good edition of this important work, the *Nyāyakuliśa.* The lucid summaries in English and Sanskrit, which the editors have prepared with great care and prefixed to the text of the work, will considerably enhance the usefulness of this publication.

Annamalainagar,
1—8—1938.

S. Kuppuswami Sastri.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

INTRODUCTION

Nyāyakuliśa occupies a prominent place in the development of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy after Rāmānuja. Its author, Ātreya Rāmānuja, was the *guru* and the maternal uncle of the famous Vedānta Deśika (1268-1369). He was the fifth in the succession of illustrious Viśiṣṭādvaitic teachers (*guruparamparā*) commencing from Bhagavad Rāmānuja, the author of *Śrī Bhāṣya*. It is noteworthy that, in the apostolic succession, the great Rāmānuja was followed by three members of the family to which Ātreya Rāmānuja belonged, namely, his great-grandfather, his grandfather and his own father. Thus Ātreya Rāmānuja and his lineal ancestors enjoyed the proud privilege of being the accredited exponents of Viśiṣṭādvaitic thought to the four successive generations that followed Bhagavad Rāmānuja. Some of the most eminent thinkers and men of letters of later days were also scions of this illustrious stock. The celebrated Gopala Deśika of Kumbakonam and the poet Venkatādhvarin may be cited as examples. Among the chief contributions of the former to philosophic thought the most important are *Sārāsvādinī*, a brilliant commentary on *Rahasya-traya-sāra*, a classic exposition of Viśiṣṭādvaitism, and *Nikṣepacintāmaṇi*. Śrī Gopāla Deśika had the unique distinction of being the preceptor of three *sannyāsins*. Venkaṭādhvarin, the author of the justly famous *Viśvaguṇādarśa*, so original in its conception and execution, was a prolific writer. *Mīmāmsā-makaranda, Vidhitraya-paritrāṇa, Śravaṇānanda, Lakṣmīsahasra* and *Uttara-campū* are among his compositions.

The materials for writing Ātreya Rāmānuja's biography are disappointingly scanty. It is, however, learnt on reliable authority that he was born at Conjivaram in the year 1220 A.D. (Kali era 4322; month of Citra in the year Vikrama). At the close of each chapter of *Nyāyakuliśa* he mentions himself as the son of Padmanābhārya. His father must also have been known as Raṅga Rāmānuja, as is evident from the traditional account.

caitrārdrāsambhavam kāñcyām Raṅgarājagurossutam |
supratiṣṭhāmśamātreyam Rāmānujagurum bhaje ||

His great-grandfather, Praṇatārtiharācārya, also called Kaḍāmbi Ācchān, was an able exponent of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy. So great were Praṇatārtiharācārya's scholarship and his powers of argument and exposition that he was named 'Vedāntodayana' (the Udayana of Vedāntic thought). He was the most trusted and loyal disciple of Śrī Rāmānuja, the author of *Śrī Bhāṣya*. Finding that his enemies were

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

secretly plotting to poison Rāmānuja, Goṣṭhipūrṇa, one of his five great ācāryas, was casting about for a devoted and trustworthy disciple who could be safely entrusted with the duty of protecting Rāmānuja's person, and at last found the man he sought for in Praṇatārtiharācārya and appointed him as the guardian of Rāmānuja's person. He assigned to him the responsible duty of preparing food for Rāmānuja. Hence, he came to be known as Mahānasācārya.

From his father, Ātreya Rāmānuja learnt the inner significance of the *mantras* held sacred by the Vaiṣṇavites. The eminent Vātsya Varadaguru, otherwise known as Naḍādūr Ammāl, taught him the *Śrī Bhāṣya* and other Vedāntic works. Ātreya Rāmānuja was a bold and original thinker. In recognition of his remarkable skill in dialectics, the title 'Vādihamsāmbuvāha' was conferred upon him.

Tradition, as preserved by his descendants, speaks of him as the author of three books. But of these *Nyāyakuliśa* alone is now in existence, the others having been irretrievably lost. It is a matter for great regret that even the names of these books have been forgotten. In his *Tātparya-Candrikā* the famous gloss on Rāmānuja's *Gītā-Bhāṣya*, Vedānta Deśika quotes, in the course of his comments on verses 14-15 of Chapter XVIII, Ācārya Vādihamsāmbuvāha as saying :—

> Vaiṣamye sati karmaṇāmaviṣamaḥ kim nāma kuryāt kṛtī
> kimvodāratayā dadīta Varado vāñchanti cet durgatim |

Evidently this is a quotation from one of the missing books. Judging from this fragment, one is led to believe that the work from which this has been extracted was, in all probability, a religious lyric (*stotra*) in praise of the Lord.

Vādihamsāmbuvāha was fortunate in his pupil. His nephew and disciple, Vedānta Deśika, again and again speaks of his own extraordinary good luck in having had such a preceptor and expresses his deep sense of gratitude for what his guru had done for him. In one place in the *Rahasya-traya-sāra* he says that his guru trained him as the trainer of birds would train a parrot. In another context in the same work he owns that in his own writings he is merely giving outward expression to what his ācārya had inscribed in his mind. Even when due allowance is made for Vedānta Deśika's self-effacing modesty, the fact still remains that he owes much to Ātreya Rāmānuja. Readers of *Rahasya-traya-sāra* will remember that its author refers to the great knack that his uncle and *guru* had of expressing highly abstract thoughts in an exceedingly simple manner with the aid of homely similes that enabled the listener to go straight to the heart of the matter. To explain the mystic signi-

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

ficance of the *praṇava* he would ask his pupils to remember the oft-quoted verse from the *Rāmāyaṇa*—

Agrataḥ prayayau Rāmassītāmadhye sumadhyamā |
Pṛṣṭhatastu dhanuṣpāṇiḥ Lakṣmaṇonujagāma ha ||

First went forth Rāma; Sītā, with her delicate waist, in the middle; Lakṣmaṇa, bow in hand, brought up the rear. The three letters of the praṇava, अ, उ, म्, respectively stand for the Lord, His consort and the individual soul.

The author of the *Gītā* declares that he who shrinks away from God thinking that He, by His infinite perfections, is far above finite souls is the worst of men (*narādhama*). Ātreya Rāmānuja was likewise convinced that we should approach the Lord in the spirit of the *gopīs* of old who entertained no doubts about His accessibility. He used also to express his agreement with the passage in the *Gītā* which condemns faint-heartedness on the part of the devotee.

Nyāyakuliśa (the lightning-shaft of reason) is written in stiff prose interspersed with verse. It is frequently referred to, and cited as an authority, by Vedānta Deśika in his *Nyāya-siddhāñjana, Nyāya-pariśuddhi, Tattva-muktā-kalāpa* and other works. It consists of thirteen vādas and establishes, for the most part, doctrines acceptable to all schools of Vedāntic thought. *Siddhārtha-vyutpatti-samarthana-vāda, Svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda, Svayamprakāśa-vāda, Īśvarānumāna-bhaṅga-vāda, Dehātiriktātma-yāthātmya-vāda, Sat-kārya-vāda* and *Śakti-vāda* are in support of doctrines shared in common by all schools of Vedānta. It is only in a few chapters that he crosses swords with Advaitins and Bhedābheda-vādins in seeking to establish views peculiar to the Viśiṣṭādvaitins. *Khyāti-nirūpaṇa-vāda* and *Sāmānādhikaraṇya-lakṣaṇa-vāda* carry on the controversy with the Advaitins and Bhedābhedavādins.

Since his style of exposition and argument is extremely terse and is loaded with the technical terms of Sanskrit logic, *Nyāyakuliśa* may appear obscure to readers who have not made a special study of Indian logic. A summary is, therefore, given here of the main contentions of the author, and of the arguments which he cites in their support.

ARGUMENT

1. *Siddhārtha-vyutpatti-samarthana-vāda.*

From the point of view of any school of Vedānta the most important problem is perhaps the question whether the upaniṣadic texts which speak of what exists as a fact (*siddhārtha*), Brahman or Ātman, are authoritative or not. If, as the Prābhākara school of Mīmāmsā maintains,

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

something to be done (*kārya*) is the ultimate significance of every proposition, the Veda must have such a thing (*kārya*) or an action for its final import. The entire body of the upaniṣadic texts dealing with Brahman or Ātman would lose all validity, and the ground would be cut from under the feet of the Vedāntin. Hence, the first chapter addresses itself to the task of refuting the Prābhākara view.

The Prābhākaras maintain that each word denotes not, as it is commonly supposed, the thing standing by itself, but always the thing as related in some manner to action. And the proposition which is merely a group of such words must, if it is to be intelligible at all, refer to some action. The aim of the proposition is not to communicate an idea, but to convey a command or injunction directly leading to the accomplishment of something. Those who believe that words do also denote existent entities must say that in the child's presence the father, mother, teacher or other elderly person points with the finger to different objects in the environment and at the same time also utters their respective names; the observant child learns in course of time that these words of themselves denote the several objects in the environment and that the application of such and such words to such and such things is based on the denotative power of words and that the meanings of words do not include a reference to actions. But this view, say the Prābhākaras, is not tenable. Of the three factors involved here—(i) the uttering of a name, (ii) the action of pointing with the finger, and (iii) the meaning conveyed—it has to be considered whether the sound uttered must be included, along with the significance conveyed, in what is to be taught (*bodhya*) or whether it is to be classed, along with the act of pointing, in that which teaches (the *bōdhaka*). As it is accepted by both the parties that pointing with the finger is the instrument for denoting existing things, it is needless to regard śabda also as an instrument (*bodhaka*) serving the self-same purpose. It would appear from this that śabda does not convey any significance. Hence, in respect of existent things (*siddhārtha*), śabda is not authoritative.

Again, the view that each word denotes an existing entity comes into conflict with the doctrine which we have accepted already, namely, that every word conveys a significance related to that of the other words in the sentence. For example, in the proposition 'Lift the table', 'table' does not denote the bare table as such, but the table associated with the act of lifting, and 'lift' does not refer merely to lifting in general, but to lifting as related to the table.

It is observed that a child gets to know the meanings of individual words by comparing and contrasting commands like 'Fetch the cow'

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

(gām ānaya), 'fetch the horse' (aśvam ānaya) and 'tie up the cow' (gām badhāna) and so forth which elderly persons use in daily intercourse. Since this is the natural process of learning a language the meaning of every word comes to be associated in the child's mind with some action or other. It follows, therefore, that every word has the power to signify an action, but never the mere capacity to signify existent things.

As against this view the author urges that it is not without a purpose that when an elderly person tries to teach the young the significance of words he both points to objects and utters their names. It is only when the object denoted by the word, rather than the utterance of the word itself, is considered as the *bodhya* (what is made known), entering upon any activity in regard to that object or refraining therefrom would be possible. Therefore, śabda cannot legitimately be treated as the *bodhya*; it can only be regarded as the *bodhaka*. While the act of pointing with the finger will quite suffice for awakening a knowledge of the object, the utterance of the word is not altogether superfluous. It serves to fix the matter durably in the mind; just as the use of different synonyms helps to din the idea into the mind of the pupil.

There is no truth in the charge that the belief that words denote matters of fact comes into conflict with the doctrine of *anvitābhidhāna* (i.e. the view that any word in a sentence conveys something, not as an isolated unit, but as closely bound up with that of other words in the same sentence). For what really happens is this: each word in a sentence at first recalls to mind something. E.g., in the judgment 'Fetch the cow', the term 'fetch' recalls to mind some significance and 'cow' revives some past impressions. Whether the revived elements fit into an intelligible whole of meaning is next considered by taking note of factors, such as *yogyatā* (congruity), *ākānkṣā* (the demand for a word or words to complete the sense) and *sannidhi* (proximity). It is only after the syntatical, logical and phonetic connections of words have been taken into account that each word in the sentence can be said to express a meaning—a meaning associated with what the other word has recalled. 'Fetch,' for example, conveys a meaning associated with what 'cow' has recalled; and 'cow' denotes something related to what 'fetch' has revived.

A similar explanation holds good of assertive propositions also. In the proposition 'This cow is white,' 'this cow' denotes something related to the significance recalled by the term 'white'; and the word 'white' has a meaning closely bound up with what the term 'cow' has recalled to mind. Thus, in no case need we give up the doctrine of *anvitābhidhāna*.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

2. *Svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda.*

To prove that the Vedas are in their very nature (*svataḥ*) valid, the author, in the manner of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāmsakas, seeks to establish in this chapter the doctrine known as *svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda* (the self-validity of knowledge). In demonstrating this position the main controversy is with the Naiyāyikas who are advocates of *parataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda* (the theory of validity from outside).

The Naiyāyika contends that both in respect of its origin (*utpattau*) and in respect of discovery (*jñaptau*) validity is extrinsic, and not intrinsic, to the judgment. Taking the question of how knowledge comes to be true or false (*utpattu*) it must be conceded, says the Naiyāyika, that validity or invalidity depends respectively upon the honesty and competence of the speaker (*vaktṛ-guṇa*) or his ignorance, deceit and other defects (*vaktṛ-doṣa*). It is of the very nature of knowledge to be revelatory of reality (*arthaprakāśatva*); and this character of revealing the reality is a general feature (*sādhāraṇa-dharma*) found in valid and invalid cognitions alike. Validity and invalidity, however, are special features (*viśeṣa-dharmas*) met with in certain judgments alone. Though each of these may co-exist with jñānatva, each is yet different from the latter. Hence it follows that whether a given judgment is true or false depends entirely upon circumstances other than those that account for the genesis of the the judgment itself. The following analogy illustrates this position. While *vṛkṣatva* (tree-ness) is a wider generality present alike in the *śiṁśapā, palāśa* and other trees, *simśapātva* and *palāśatva* are narrower generalities present only in a limited area. Tree-ness may co-exist with śiṁśapātva. None the less, the two are considered distinct.

Coming to the question of how we become aware of truth and falsity, in order to ascertain the validity of a judgment it is necessary to take note of external considerations, such as awareness of (i) the honesty and competence of the speaker (*guṇa-jñāna*), (ii) the consensus of opinion (*samvāda-jñāna*) and (iii) its capacity to lead to fruitful actions (*artha-kriyā-kāri*).

The Naiyāyika goes on to point out that on the view that the very factors which enable us to apprehend the knowledge itself must also reveal its prāmāṇya, there would be no possibility of doubt regarding the validity of judgments.

He thinks that there is no danger of the authoritativeness of the Vedas being sacrificed if the doctrine of self-validity is not accepted. For on the doctrine of *parataḥ-prāmāṇya,* invalidity must result from the defects of the source. Since the omniscient Lord, the author of the Vedas,

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

possesses infinite perfections and can have no defects of any kind, the Vedas cannot be invalid. Therefore, in order to establish that the vedic teaching is valid, it is needless to subscribe to *svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda.*

This may be expressed in syllogistic form as follows:—Validity is dependent upon circumstances other than the causes of knowledge; for, while being an effect, validity, like invalidity, is a particular mode of knowledge.

The main point of the refutation is that *jñānatva* and *prāmāṇya* are not separate, but identical. Prāmāṇya is merely the power of revealing the thing as it really is. In other words, it consists in taking note of the thing possessing qualifications (*viśeṣya*), the qualifications (*viśeṣaṇas*), and the relation between these (*sambandha*). Just as the power to burn things is inherent in fire, even so prāmāṇya belongs to the very essence of jñāna. It is present in true judgments as also in false ones; for even in the illusion 'idam rajatam' (this is silver), so far as the subjective element 'idam' is concerned there is prāmāṇya.

Even if jñānatva and prāmāṇya were different, it could not be suggested on reasonable grounds that prāmāṇya is a special feature (*viśeṣa-dharma*) like palāśatva or śiṁśapātva. For, just as a certain bodily form or structure (*samsthāna*) is present in all cows and serves to manifest *gotva*, *prāmāṇya* is present in knowledge and serves to reveal *jñānatva*. Even when the form or structure of a particular cow does not conform in every detail to the type, for the reason that the given animal is hornless, blind or otherwise defective, the name 'cow' is not denied to it. Similarly, in the case of the illusory cognition, even in the absence of *sambandha*, the remaining two factors do suffice for manifesting jñānatva. Just as a certain structure or form (*samsthāna*) which serves to reveal *gotva* is considered a general quality, even so *prāmāṇya* which helps to manifest *jñānatva* may quite well be a common feature. But for prāmāṇya, knowledge would cease to be knowledge.

Next it is shown that the analogy of 'treeness' is not apposite. In the *śiṁśapā* tree there are two aspects—(1) certain features common to all trees indicative of *vṛkṣatva* (treesness) and (2) certain features peculiar to the *śiṁśapā* tree revealing *śiṁśapātva*. But in the case of jñāna apart from the general feature, namely, *prāmāṇya* which reveals jñānatva, no special feature revealing prāmāṇya is met with. Therefore, on the analogy of tree-ness and śiṁśapātva which stand respectively for wider and narrower generalities, we cannot treat jñānatva and prāmāṇya as *sādhāraṇa* and *viśeṣa dharmas*. Hence, in respeect of origin (*utpatti*), besides the causes of knowledge no other factors are needed to account

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

for prāmāṇya. In a word, prāmāṇya is inherent in the very nature of knowledge.

Again, the truth of a judgment cannot be said to be discovered from a knowledge of the merits (*guṇa*) of the speaker. When the knowledge of an object arises in the self, the object comes to be endowed with an illumination, known as *jñānatva, prakāśa,* or *artha-prakāśa.* Validity is simply the power of jñāna to produce this *artha-prakāśa.* From the *artha-prakāśa,* the effect, its cause, namely, *jñāna* is inferred. The inference which reveals jñāna must also make known its prāmāṇya (validity). When the discovery of truth is said to be intrinsic (*svataḥ*) all that is meant is that the validity of knowledge is understood from the very inference whereby knowledge itself is inferred, and that no additional factor is required therefor.

The charge that on *svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda* there would be no room for any doubt regarding prāmāṇya (validity) in any circumstances is met by saying that one may believe in self-validity and still entertain doubts. Belief in self-validity does not obviate doubt. As long as there is room for suspecting that there may be factors leading to *aprāmāṇya,* doubts are bound to arise even though there is belief in validity. To illustrate the point.—Even though it is well known that the seed has the power to produce the sprout, one may yet entertain doubts about a particular seed, for who knows it has not lost its power to germinate on account of its proximity to fire. It is only when the person can be sure that the seed could not have been placed by the side of the fire that he could give up this doubt. This doubt does not lead one to abandon the general belief in the power of the seed to sprout. Similarly, even when it is known that judgments are in their innate nature valid, yet doubts concerning the validity of particular judgments may arise, so long as the possibilities of their being invalid are not ruled out. The existence of doubts does not necessarily lead to the rejection of the belief that the discovery of validity is instrinsic (*svataḥ*).

In conclusion, it is shown that the argument advanced by the opponent is liable to be charged with the fallacy of *hetva-siddhi. Prāmāṇya,* as indicated already, is a general feature and not a special quality requiring a special cause.

3. *Khyāti-nirūpaṇa-vāda.*

In this chapter the author repudiates the *akhyāti* of the Prābhākara Mīmāmsakas and the *Anirvacanīya-khyāti* of the Advaitins and maintains the *Anyathā-khyāti* of the Naiyāyikas and *Yathārtha-khyāti* advocated by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

The Prābhākaras contend that in the erroneous cognition 'This is silver' there is no sensory contact with silver. 'This' is a presented fact; and 'silver' is a memory experience. There are thus two elements—(i) experience of present object and (ii) memory—and not a single psychosis as the Naiyāyika supposes. But against this, the Naiyāyika urges that, if the representative element concerns silver in the shop (*āpanasta*), there could only be the judgment 'There is silver in the shop' and not 'This object on the roadside is silver.' The Prābhākara answer is that owing to certain defects (*doṣa*) the real location of silver is lost sight of. A person proceeds to pick the object on the road side, not because he perceives the silver element therein, but because he fails to notice the difference between the memory of silver and the presented object.

The very existence of differences of opinion among rival thinkers may be said to point to *anyathā-khyāti*. Take the two statements: "Sound (śabda) is eternal' and 'Sound is non-eternal.' Since two mutually contradictory qualities cannot reside in the self-same object, the person who believes in the eternity of sound thinks that eternity is present in sound, and that, consequently, his opponent has understood the nature of sound differently from what it is. Similarly, the believer in the perishability of sound thinks that 'non-eternity' dwells in sound and that, therefore, his opponent has misunderstood the nature of sound. Hence the quarrel between the two. But on the Prābhākara view that error is not a unit of knowledge but a composite of two *jñānas*, the judgment 'sound is eternal' would consist of two items of *jñāna*—(i) śabda and (ii) eternity; and the judgment 'sound is non-eternal,' conveys knowledge of sound and also knowledge of non-eternity. In either case, the judgment does not assert that eternity or non-eternity is present in sound. And so long as this is not so, there is no room for dispute.

A consideration of the way in which the subsequent judgment falsifies the earlier but erroneous cognition would serve to show that in the first cognition the mind must have understood the thing differently from its real nature (*anyathā*). The sublating cognition, 'This is not silver; it is only shell' presupposes an earlier judgment 'This is silver', where the silver element is erroneously synthesised with 'this'.

Further, so long as the silver element is not perceived in 'this' that is, so long as the nature of the object on the roadside is not grasped differently from what it is (*anyathā*), there will not arise the activity of picking the object. On the Prābhākara account the activity of picking the object, as though it were silver, is due merely to our failure to notice the difference between the memory element (i.e., silver) and the

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

perceived element (*bhedāgrahaṇa*). If so, we must also react to it as shell, because in it we do not perceive the difference from the shell. Should it be said that the difference from the shell is perceived, clearly there is *anyathā-khyāti* or wrong synthesis.

Bhrānti or illusory cognition is a particular mode of knowledge and is a mistake of commission, and not one of omission. It is the mere failure to apprehend difference. If so, as there is non-apprehension of difference in deep sleep, deep sleep would have to be treated as bhrānti. Hence, it follows that illusion involves *anyathā-khyāti.*

It is *anyathā-khyāti* rather than *akhyāti* that does justice to the nature of experience. When a person realises his mistake, he is found to confess 'I mistook shell for silver'; he is never found to say "I failed to keep apart the memory of silver from the perceived object on the road."

The advocates of *anirvacanīya-khyāti* assert that jñāna is the only ultimate reality. Since it is quality-less, the character of apprehending the object which is ordinarily ascribed to *jñāna* cannot, strictly speaking, be attributed to it. The objects apprehended are neither *sat* nor *asat.* For, if they were unreal, they would not be perceived; and if they were real, they would not be sublated. But they are perceived and later sublated. Hence, they are indescribable or *anirvacanīya.* This pure consciousness or *jñāna* is no other than the substrate (āśraya) of illegitimate transference (*adhyāsa*).

In refutation of *anirvacanīya-khyāti* it is first pointed out that as knowledge is said to partake of the characters of being *parokṣa* (indirect), *aparokṣa* (immediate), *anubhava* (experience), *smṛti* (memory) and so forth, jñāna cannot be said to be *nirdharmaka* (without qualities). Secondly, as objects of experience are known, they are *sat;* and as they are later contradicted, they are *asat;* and they would thus be both *sat* and *asat* and not *sadasad-vilakṣaṇa* or *anirvacanīya.* Moreover, it cannot be said that *jñāna* is merely the *āśraya* of illegitimate transference (*adhyāsa*). On the contrary, it really points to an object outside. It is the very nature of knowledge to point to really existent things.

The doctrine of quintuplication (*pañcī-karaṇa*), according to which all objects of the perceptible world contain all the five elements (*bhūtas*) though in varying proportions, lends support to *yathārtha-khyāti.* On this view, the object concerning which the illusory judgment 'This is silver' arises contains silver as also shell. The silver element is, however, very slight, the shell element predominating. It is the failure to

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

note the slightness (*alpatva*) of the silver element and the preponderance of the shell element that accounts for the illusion. The subsequent judgment "This is not silver" arises when the dominance of the shell element is realised, and it inhibits the activity which was prompted by the failure to notice this dominance. The assertion that the erroneous cognition 'this is silver' disappears when the subsequent judgment "This is shell" arises does not mean that the former judgment is abandoned; it only signifies that the activity prompted by the earlier cognition is arrested. Thus, all judgments reveal only what exist.

4. *Svayamprakāśa-vāda.*

The fourth chapter is devoted to the establishment of the doctrine that jñāna is self-luminous (*svayamprakāśa*). The ground is prepared for this doctrine by the refutation of the views of Kumārila, Murāri Miśra and the Naiyāyikas in regard to this matter.

According to Kumārila jñāna has the power to reveal other objects excepting itself. It does not, however, mean that it is unknowable. Though it cannot be grasped by the senses, it is inferred from the illumination (*prākaṭya*) which it generates in objects that are known. Thus it is not self-luminous. This view is rather far-fetched. For explaining why vision apprehends only the colour of objects and not their smell, even though colour and smell are equally inherent in the objects that are seen, the aid of *prākaṭya* (power of manifestation) is invoked. It is said that the visual mechanism has a power in virtue of which the knowledge it generates has the peculiar property of producing an illumination with regard to colour alone. A simpler explanation, says Murāri Miśra, would be to recognise that visual knowledge has merely the power to apprehend colours, and dispense with the notion of *prākaṭya*. Even after positing this mysterious prākaṭya for which there is no warrant, it may be asked why *prākaṭya* is generated in regard to colour and not to smell. The only possible answer would be that visual knowledge has this special power of producing an illumination in colour alone. With the denial of *prākaṭya*, the theory that knowledge is inferred therefrom falls to the ground.

Nor can it be contended that knowledge is self-luminous. For if it is self-luminous, it must illumine itself, just as it manifests other things; that is to say, it will be its own object (*viṣaya*). Since the object (*viṣaya*) is considered the cause of perceptual knowledge, this line of argument would lead to the self-refuting position that knowledge is the cause of itself. Therefore, it has to be concluded that jñāna is grasped by *anuvyavasāya* (reflection upon experience). This reflection is of the form 'I know the pot'.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

The view defended by the author is that jñāna is like the lamp which dispels darkness and reveals objects and does not require for its own manifestation another lamp. Similarly, by its conjunction with objects, jñāna reveals objects; but in regard to its own manifestation, jñāna does not require another jñāna. The objection that, since jñāna is a quality, it cannot come into conjunction with objects is not valid; for, as it is said to be subject to expansion and contraction, jñāna must be treated as a substance. When jñāna is said to be self-luminous what is really meant is that jñāna, unlike other objects, does not require for its own manifestation conjunction with another jñāna. This may be expressed in syllogistic form. This jñāna does not require for its manifestation anything other than itself; for, like the lamp, it manifests objects.

5. *Īśvarānumāna-bhanga-vāda.*

Unless the view that God is inferred (*ānumānika*) is abandoned the scriptures would lose their authority. On the well-known principle that the śāstras are valid only with regard to matters lying beyond the scope of the other pramāṇas (aprāpte śāstram arthavat), if God is known through inference, then, in respect of God, the scriptures are futile. It is not helpful to point out that, while reason establishes only the existence of God, the scriptures are necessary for giving information about those who attend upon him (*parijana*), his dwelling place and so on. For the scriptures would then be dependent upon reason and cannot contradict its verdict. It is only after the existence of God has been established by reason that one may proceed to inquire into His attendants, abode etc., from the study of the scriptures. When reason tells us that God is endowed with infinite perfections, how can the scriptures convey the opposite teaching that his attendants, abode and so on add to his glory? Nor is it possible to obviate this difficulty by saying that while God's existence is inferred from reason, His being the material cause of the world is learnt only from the scriptures and that, in this sense, the scriptures are not robbed of their usefulness. For if so, He must act as the material cause of the world either by being endowed with a body or by remaining without one; and either alternative would lead to an unwelcome result. On the former alternative, He would become a *samsārin*; on the latter, the view accepted by us, namely, that God is the material cause only through His body, would have to be abandoned. Thus, so long as it is not admitted that the scriptures teach the existence of God, they cannot be assigned an intelligible purpose. To establish their prime usefulness it is necessary to demolish the view that God is *ānumānika*.

The main argument by which the Naiyāyika attempts to prove God's existence is the following:—Like the jar, earth and other objects

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Herjtage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

are effects; because they point to an agent. As the finite soul is incapable of producing them, this agent must be a competent maker, that is, God. That these objects are effects is vouched for both by perception and by inference. The argument takes the following form:—Earth and the like are effects; for, like the jar, they possess parts. Against this argument it may be urged that the relation between 'being an effect' and 'pointing to an agent' is far from being universal and that it is really dependent upon the accidental feature (*upādhi*), namely, *śakyakriyatva* (capacity for being produced), and that consequently the argument is liable to be charged with *vyāpyatvāsiddha*.

But this objection is valueless, because *śakyakriyatva*, though not perceptible, is yet inferred to exist wherever the *sādhana*, 'being an effect,' is present. Therefore, the argument is free from the charge of *vyāpyatvāsiddha*.

The futility of the argument advanced by the Naiyāyika is exposed by showing that when he argues that earth and other objects point to an agent, he must mean by 'agent' either the bare self as such or the self endowed with volition (*yatna*) alone or the self endowed with a volition which is associated with auxiliary causes, such as, knowledge and power. On the first alternative, his argument becomes vitiated by the defect of *bādha*, in as much as it would only establish that the cause of the world is a self devoid of volition and other qualities and not an Omnipotent Lord. A further defect of the argument is that the *sādhya* is not present in the illustrative example cited. The second alternative fares no better; for on this view the self is the cause of the world either in virtue of its bare volition or through the outward activities in which the volition expresses itself. If the former is correct, there is the old difficulty of the *sādhya* not being present in the illustrative examples adduced. The mere volition of the potter, for example, would not suffice for the production of the jar. If the latter view is advocated, the Naiyāyika would be guilty of contradicting his theory that the tendency of fire to proceed upwards or that of wind to blow side-ways is all due to *adṛṣṭa* and not to any volition and its expression in outward act. Even if it be conceded for the sake of argument that a self endowed with such a volition as expresses itself in outward activity is the cause of the world all that the argument could prove is that the maker of the cosmos is an intelligent person and not that he is omniscient. Volition could only indicate that its possessor is endowed with intelligence; it need not point to omniscience. Should it be said that since volition takes different forms according to the effects intended to be produced, and is dependent on the knowledge of the particular thing to be produced and that, in the case of the creation of the world, its maker should be all knowing, it is replied that volition need not depend upon knowledge. Take for example, the

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

case of deep sleep; here the effort to live is not dependent upon any knowledge. The third alternative is equally faulty. There is no point in saying that the maker of the world is a self endowed with volition found along with knowledge, power and so on which are auxiliary thereto; because, as pointed out already, volition is not necessarily dependent upon knowledge. If it be said that, as volition exists along with knowledge, knowledge is inferred from volition, it is replied that by parity of reasoning one should infer the existence of a body, since volition is associated with the presence of a body.

Not only this; there are arguments proving an opposite conclusion. Eg., if earth and other objects point to an agent at all, that agent must be an embodied person, an individual possessing knowledge which is non-eternal and an ordinary person like any one of us, and not possessed of ommiscience.

6. *Dehādyatiriktātma-yāthātmya-vāda*

That the soul is an entity different from the body, senses, mind (manas), vital breath (prāṇa) and intellect (buddhi), that it is distinct from the Supreme Soul, that each soul is distinct from every other soul, that it is an agent (kartā), a knower and the object of self-consciousness (*aham-pratyaya*) is the teaching of this chapter. As a preliminary to the establishment of this thesis, the Cārvāka and the Advaitic conceptions of the soul are subjected to a rigorous examination.

The Cārvāka accepts the view that the soul is the object of self-consciousness (*aham-pratyaya*), but draws therefrom the conclusion that the soul is identical with the body; for there arises the cognition 'I am a man', 'I am a deva' and so on. The soul is not to be identified with the senses; for no one ever gets the cognition 'I am the nose', or 'I am the ear'. Nor is it to be equated with the mind (manas); for the mind, being an instrument of knowledge, cannot also be its agent (*kartā*). The soul is not the vital breath (*prāṇa*) either; for when vital breath continues to be active even when the body is at rest, there arises the cognition 'I am wholly inactive'. It is equally impossible to equate the soul with consciousness (buddhi); for, since jñāna comes from the root *jña* (to know), it refers to something to be accomplished and not to the soul which is an existent entity (*siddhārta*). Thus by a process of elimination also it is shown that the soul is no other than the body. It may be asked: Does not the cognition 'This is my body' mark off the soul from the body? The Cārvāka replies that this difficulty is not peculiar to him, but that the cognition 'This is my self' creates a similar difficulty for his opponents also; and that the escape open to them, namely the device of understanding this proposition in a figurative sense, is open to him too.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

Though the elements (*bhūtas*) which compose the body are severally insentient, consciousness, the Cārvāka argues, may still emerge from their peculiar concatenation. It may be likened to the emergence of the intoxicating quality from the mingling of certain ingredients which separately do not possess it. As infancy, youth, manhood and so on are merely different states of the self-same body, there is nothing improper in a person in middle age remembering what he experienced in infancy and youth.

The Advaitins assert that the soul is an inner (*pratyak*) principle distinct from the body and that it is not to be confounded with the knower. To say that the soul is *pratyak* is to assert that it is self-luminous. As knowledge alone is self-luminous, the soul must be identified with *cit* (consciousness). If the soul is described as a knower, it would be the possessor of knowledge. In other words, it would be different from jñāna. If so, the soul would become external (*parāk*); for whatever is different from jñāna is *parāk*.

Some of the outstanding difficulties in the way of the Cārvāka doctrine are the following.—On the view which identifies the soul with the body, either the body is an aggregate of parts or it is something additional to the parts that enter into its composition. In any case, consciousness must be admitted to reside in the parts; because it is well-known that the special qualities of the whole (*avayavī*) are dependent on those of the parts (*avayava*); and because there could be no consciousness in the aggregate when the parts composing it are devoid of consciousness. But the parts do not possess it; for, if they did, they would be equated with the self and there would arise cognitions such as 'I am the foot,' 'I am the hand'. Judgments such as 'I feel pain in the eye', 'I have a comfortable feeling in the head' cannot be said to indicate the presence of consciousness in the bodily parts; for they only show that the self experiences pleasure or pain in the regions mentioned. Further, if some part of the body alone possessed consciousness, with the loss of that organ, consciousness would be altogether lost. If each of the bodily parts were to possess consciousness, there would be several conscious entities in the same body and these would, like the residents of a village, be constantly warring with one another. For the conscious entity is notorious for its self-regarding impulses.

It is untenable to argue that just as the betel leaf, areca nut and lime, which do not separately possess redness, yet produce the red colour when they are chewed together, consciousness may emerge from out of the factors that constitute the body, even though taken severally these factors are insentient. What really happens is the particles of the betel

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

leaf, the nut and lime first acquire the red colour on account of the heat engendered in the act of chewing. Thus the red colour in the effect is accounted for by the causes themselves acquiring it. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that a property not present in the causal factors severally may well emerge when they combine together in certain special ways.

Besides, if this materialistic doctrine were true, all religious duties such as, *yāga* (sacrifice) and *dāna* (gift), performed for the sake of rewards to be reaped after bodily death would be labour wholly lost, and the *śāstras* prescribing such duties would become meaningless.

In refutation of the Advaitic doctrine the author points out that knowledge cannot be the self, because the judgment 'I know' clearly shows that knowledge is an attribute of 'I' rather than the self itself. Again, knowledge is well-known to have a beginning and an end; and it cannot, therefore, be identified with the eternal self. The real meaning of pratyak is not 'being self-luminous' as the Advaitins contend, but 'shining forth for the sake of oneself'. As *jñāna* shines forth for the sake of the self and not for its own sake, it must, with pots and other objects, be treated as *parāk*. The self alone can be said to shine for its own sake. Therefore, it alone is *pratyak*. Again, if the *śāstras* which prescribe several duties for the realisation of different benefits are not to be robbed of their meaning, the soul must be admitted to be an agent and an enjoyer. *Kartṛtva* (being an agent) and *bhoktṛtva* (being an enjoyer) cannot be explained away as being due to limiting conditions.

7. *Sāmānādhikaraṇya-vāda*

For a proper understanding of Vedāntic passages, such as 'satyam jñānam anantam Brahma', it is essential that the true nature of sāmānādhikaraṇya (the grammatical co-ordination of words in a sentence) must be grasped at the very outset. Consequently, the author takes up for consideration the definition of sāmānādhikaraṇya laid down by the grammarians, examines the interpretations put on it by the Bhedābhedavādins and Advaitins, and in the end establishes what he considers the correct interpretation.

Sāmānādhikaraṇya is defined by the grammarians as follows. Words having different pravṛtti-nimitta (reasons of application or significations), but referring to an identical object (i.e. words having connotational difference and denotational identity) may be said to stand in the relation of sāmānādhikaraṇya. The Bhedābhedavādins believe that this definition accords best only with their own fundamental philosophical creed—the doctrine that a substance is different and yet non-different

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

from its viśeṣaṇas (qualifications). Take, they say, the judgment 'This is a cow'. The words 'this' and 'cow' have different reasons of application or significations (binna-pravṛttinimitta); 'this' stands for a particular object (*vyakti*) and 'cow' for the jāti, 'cow-ness'; and they refer to an identical object, since jāti and vyakti are not altogether different. In the judgment 'This is white', the words 'this' and 'white' have different meanings, the first word referring to an object in front of the speaker and the second to whiteness; and both refer to the identical object, since *guṇa* and *guṇi* cannot be said to be altogether different.

A possible objection to this view is that in the judgment examined the term 'cow', like the word daṇḍi (person wielding a stick), refers to a vyakti (a particular animal possessing 'cow-ness') and not to mere jāti (cow-ness), and that, consequently, this equation cannot teach that vyakti and jāti are non-different. The Bhedābheda-vādin meets this objection by pointing out that jāti is nowhere found separately from the vyakti in the manner in which the stick is found in isolation from the person wielding it, and that the word 'cow' does not denote an entity possessing cow-ness. Further, if vyakti and jāti were different, they must, like the stick and its possessor, be known in isolation from each other. But as they are not apprehended separately, they must be identical.

Moreover, since two objects having different shapes cannot occupy the same place, the whole (*avayavī*) and part (*avayava*) residing in the same region must be understood to be non-different. The Bhedābheda-vādin claims that on the basis of the doctrine of simultaneous difference and non-difference it is easy to assign an intelligible meaning to the upaniṣadic passages equating Brahman with man and material nature.

Briefly stated, the advaitic position is this.—A statement of co-ordination is incapable of expressing the fact of one thing possessing several attributes (*viśeṣaṇas*); on the other hand, it aims at teaching the bare existence of an indivisible whole of reality (*akhaṇḍasvarūpa*). It cannot signify the qualifications alone; for in that case the qualifications being numerous, the belief that the statement refers to a single object must be abandoned. Nor can it refer to an object possessing viśeṣaṇas. Since it is the very nature of a viśeṣaṇa to mark off or distinguish one object from another, the several qualifications must differentiate the objects qualified by them. And, as a consequence, the view that the statement expresses one object must be given up. Hence it follows that a statement of co-ordination refers to a partless whole of reality.

If the statement refers to akhaṇḍasvarūpa, what becomes of that part of the definition of sāmānādhikaraṇya which insists that the differentiated words must have their separate significations? The Advaitin

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

brushes aside this difficulty by saying that this part of the definition is merely intended to exclude tautalogous statements like 'The jar is a pot'. It is unnecessary, he contends, that the words should convey different meanings within the given statement. It is enough if they are already understood elswhere to have different connotations. Therefore, vedic texts such as 'satyam jñānam anantam Brahma,' must be taken to teach the existence of an indivisible, featureless (nirguṇa) Brahman, rather than a Brahman possessing qualities.

The main counts in the indictment against the Bhedābheda-vādin are—(i) Since *bheda* and *abheda*, which respectively take on a positive and a negative expression 'This is x' and 'This is not x', are contradictory features, they cannot be attributed to the selfsame object. (ii) It is unreasonable to contend that for the reason that jāti and vyakti are not observed separately from each other, the term cow does not denote an animal possessing cow-ness. For in order that anything may be treated as a viśeṣaṇa it is not essential that it should be observed separately or that it should have a shape of its own different from that of the object which it qualifies. When the viśeṣaṇa is known to have an independent existence and is found to qualify an object only occasionally, the suffix *matup* is added to the word denoting this viśeṣaṇa. But when the viśeṣaṇa has no independent existence of its own and is always found along with the thing which it qualifies, there is no need of that suffix. Therefore, in the statement 'This is a cow' the term 'cow' may quite well signify an animal possessing the viśeṣaṇa, 'cow-ness'. (iii) The belief that the invariable presentation of jāti and vyakti together points to their non-difference (*abheda*) is erroneous; for the very fact of their universal concomitance would only establish their separateness. (iv) For the simple reason that there is no warrant for positing a whole (*avayavī*) over and above the parts (*avayava*), the argument that since the whole and part occupy the same area they must be at once different and non-different is unsustainable. These considerations suffice to show that the attempt to interpret the definition of sāmānādhikaraṇya from the standpoint of Bhedābheda is thoroughly unconvincing.

The Advaitic interpretation of sāmānādhikaraṇya lakṣaṇa also labours under great difficulties. For one thing, on the view that the different words co-ordinated do not refer to the relation of several attributes to the unitary reality, but signify only the thing itself, any one word out of the group would suffice, and there would be no sense in employing several words. Again, of the two requirements mentioned in the sāmānādhikaraṇya lakṣaṇa—(1) that the words should have different significations and (2) should refer to an identical object—it is not known why the advaitin accepts the second and slurs over the first.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

Nor is it reasonable to contend that if the several co-ordinated words refer to different viśeṣaṇas, they would mark off the viśeṣyas (things qualified by them) from one another. For only contradictory qualities (e.g. having crumpled horns and having straight horns) which cannot reside together in the selfsame object differentiate their viśeṣyas. But where the different qualities are not opposed to one another, but may well exist together in the same object, there is no danger of their pointing to different objects. Take for example the proposition 'Devadatta is dark-complexioned, young, red-eyed, not stupid, not poor, of irreproachable character'. There is nothing contradictory in the several attributes being present in a single individual. Thus co-ordination expresses the fact of one thing being characterised by several attributes. The upaniṣadic text 'satyam jñānam anantam Brahma' must be interpreted to teach that the unitary reality, Brahman, is characterised by several attributes, and not to assert that Brahman is nirguṇa (without qualities).

After a critical consideration of the views of the Bhedābheda-vādin and Advaitin, the author sets forth what he considers to be the proper interpretation of sāmānādhikaraṇya lakṣaṇa. Different words may stand in the relation of co-ordination, if there are different reasons for their application and if they refer to one and the same object. The first part of this definition aims at showing that there can be no co-ordination between synonyms like 'pot' and 'jar'; because the reason for applying the term 'pot' to an object is not different from that prompting the use of the word 'jar'. The second part serves to point out that there can be no co-ordination between words referring to wholly different objects, e.g., pot and cloth. It rules out such meaningless co-ordinations as 'The pot is cloth'.

8. *Sat-kārya-vāda*

The problem of causality which has evoked very keen controversy is next tackled. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of causality known as *asat-kārya-vāda* (the view that the effect has no existence before it is brought into existence, but originates afresh) is subjected to a penetrating criticism and *sat-kārya-vāda* (the doctrine that the effect pre-exists in its cause in a latent form) established.

Asat-kārya-vāda teaches that the cause and effect are wholly disparate. Of the several arguments advanced in support of this thesis one is that the cause and the effect give rise to altogether distinct cognitions (*buddhi*). If the cause and the effect were different names for what is substantially the same, the cognition of any one of them must mean the cognition of the other. But, as a matter of fact, their cognitions are quite

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

different. The cause and the effect are referred to by different words (śabda). Their number varies; e.g., the threads are many, but the cloth is one. They serve different purposes; e.g., threads are serviceable for producing cloth, while the cloth is useful for wearing. They have different forms (*ākāra*) and exist at different instants of time (*kāla*); the cause (e.g. threads) is an earlier occurrence; but the effect (e.g. cloth) is a subsequent event. They arise from different causes; e.g. threads have cotton for their cause, while the cloth has threads as its cause.

A second argument is that if the effect pre-exists in the cause, there will be no need to admit several factors conducive to the production of the effect. If, for example, the cloth exists in the threads, the weaver would have no function.

A third reason is that if effects do not come into being but always prefigure in their causes, there will be no basis for the familiar distinction between things eternal and things non-eternal. The Naiyāyika thinks that there is no force in the objection that differences of buddhi, śabda, and so on existing between the cause and the effect do not indicate that they are altogether distinct, but only show that such differences arise only from the different states (*avasthās*) assumed by what is substantially the same entity. For the opponent must say either that a given avasthā is present in both the cause and the effect, or that it is present in the one or the other, there being no fixity in regard to this matter, or that it is present as a definite rule in one of them. On the first alternative, the identical state will exist in both, and cannot, therefore, account for differences in jñāna, śabda, etc. On the next alternative, kāraṇāvasthā may as well be found in the effect and the kāryāvasthā in the cause, and there will, thus, be no basis for the differences in question. On the last alternative, kāraṇāvasthā will always be met with only in the cause and the kāryāvasthā in the effect; and hence there would be no warrant for asserting the substantial identity of cause and effect. To say that they are one would amount, it is alleged, to attributing contradictory qualities (*kāraṇāvasthā* and *kāryāvasthā*) to the self-same object.

In reply to the Nyāya arguments it is first urged that the Naiyāyika assumes it as a self-evident fact that we have two wholly different cognitions about cause and effect, and that, on the strength of this gratuitous assumption, he argues that they are different. This argument falls to the ground when it is shown that we do not get two wholly distinct cognitions about them, but usually experience them as being non-different. We often remark "what was once a lump of clay has now become this pot", "what was formerly a bundle of threads has now become this cloth." This co-ordination of cause and effect and the fact that no one

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

is ever found to say "This is a new substance where, however, the *upādāna-kāraṇa* (material cause) persists" clearly point out that there is no warrant for saying that the effect (e.g. cloth) does not pre-exist in the cause (threads), and that it is really a new substance wherein, however, threads continue to exist.

Again, there is little difficulty in accounting for differences of jñāna, śabda and the like on the basis of differences of state (avasthā). The cause has, as a definite rule, a state of its own, and the effect its own particular avasthā. To say so would amount, it was urged, to ascribing contradictory qualities to the selfsame thing, and would only strengthen the case for the distinctness of the cause from the effect. But this difficulty is wholly imaginary. For, unlike the mutually opposed attributes of white and not white which cannot reside in an identical object but point to two different substrates, kāraṇāvasthā and kāryāvasthā may well belong to the identical object but at different times. Hence, there is no need to assert that cause and effect are wholly different.

Further, the conjunction (*samyōga*) of threads is admitted by the Nyāya-Viśeṣika to be *the asamavāyi-kāraṇa* of cloth. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin contends that, since this conjunction itself suffices to explain the differences of jñāna, śabda and the like, it is unnecessary to posit for this purpose an effect (cloth) wholly different from its cause (threads). It is only in virtue of this conjuction that the threads so conjoined get the name, and occasion the knowledge of, 'cloth'.

Besides, sat-kārya-vāda has the support of the scriptures. The upaniṣadic text declares that by knowing one thing everything becomes known; and, in illustration of this, takes the case of clay and says that by understanding it all objects made out of clay, such as pot and cups, are understood. Clearly, the idea conveyed here is that when the material cause is known, its manifold effects are thereby known. And this would be impossible if the cause and the effect were totally different.

9. *Samsthāna-sāmānya-samarthana-vāda*

The question of the precise nature of sāmānya (universal) has long been the battle-ground of philosophers. The Viśiṣṭādvaitins have identified sāmānya with samsthāna (structure). But the Naiyāyika has elevated jāti to the rank of a distinct principle. On his view, *jāti* is the generic property perceptible equally in all the particulars (*vyaktis*) of a class. It is eternal, unitary, ubiquitous (*anekānugatam*) and directly apprehended. It is not a mere product of the imagination as the Buddhists contend, but a factor of reality existing out there in the objective world. When we describe an animal as a cow

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

we are said to affirm the presence therein of a generic feature called *gotva* (cow-ness), a feature present in all cows, whatever be their colour, stature and the like, and absent in all animals other than the cow (gavētara).

A person perceiving an animal for the first time, e.g. an elephant, tells his friend, "Look here! this is a strange animal." Though the latter has not seen this particular elephant before, he replies, on the strength of his knowledge of other elephants, "Why, there is nothing strange in this; it is an elephant and I have seen this before." This reply is intelligible, we are told, only on the view that he is acquainted with elephant-ness as a jāti distinct from the vyaktis wherein it is present.

On meeting several instances of a class, e.g. cows, a person remarks 'This is a cow', 'That is a cow', 'That other is a cow' and so forth. The rise of such a cognition can be explained, it is said, only on the hypothesis that he recognises 'cow-ness' (*gotva*) as being present in each of these instances. If, however, he does not notice 'cow-ness' in the different particulars and has merely learnt that a given *vyakti* (object) is a cow, he will not be in a position to say 'That also is a cow', 'That other also is a cow', and so on. A possible objection is that in order to account for this cognition it is unnecessary to posit the category of *jāti* and that the upādhi (same adventitious feature which does not amount to a *jāti*) would quite suffice. E.g., to say X, Y, Z and so on are cooks it is needless to posit a jāti called *pācakatva*. These persons could be treated as forming a class merely with the aid of the upādhi, namely, 'engaged in cooking'. This objection is lacking in force, because, so long as the concept of jāti existing in *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (quality), and *karma* (action) is not admitted, the *upādhi* (adventitious circumstance) alone would be incapable of bringing together several particulars under a common head. Taking the very example adduced by the objector, it could be shown that the act of cooking could not bring together all persons engaged in this act into a single class, until the jāti of *pākatva* is admitted to exist in the several acts of cooking. Therefore it must be concluded that terms, such as cow and horse, are employed for the reason (*pravṛtti-nimitta*) that in the objects in question 'cow-ness,' 'horse-ness' and the like are present. It cannot be contended that the reasons for employing these words is the presence of certain appropriate forms (saṃsthāna) in the objects. For this view would imply that the samsthāna is either one or many. If the former, samsthāna would merely be jāti under a different name, and the dispute would centre round the name alone. If the latter, there would be a plurality of reasons for employing the same word (pravṛtti-nimitta-bheda). Thus either alternative leads to an unwelcome result. To obviate this difficulty if it is said that any one of the several sams-

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

thānas constitutes the pravṛtti-nimitta, then, the position is liable to be charged with *vyabhicāra doṣa*. For, taking each one of the samsthānas it could be shown that in its absence the name could still be employed.

The Naiyāyika further urges that the very possibility of inference would be jeopardised if *jāti* is not accepted. For the vyāpti (universal relation) which is the very basis of inference is not the statement of relation between one particular and another, but an expression of universal connection between two sets of particulars, each set having same common property (jāti).

An examination of the way in which children learn the significance of words from the commands of elderly persons is said to reveal the fact that children come by concepts (jāti) by the abstraction of particular features and the fixing up of common qualities.

The siddhāntin is of opinion that *jāti* or *sāmānya* is closely similar samsthāna. Sāmānya literally means 'the nature shared in common by similar objects' (samānānām bhāvassāmānyam); it denotes the nature of objects coming under a common group. Since it is possible to account for the cognition 'This is a cow' 'That is a cow' 'That other is also a cow', with the aid of the closely similar feature present in several vyaktis, a *jāti* distinct from *samsthāna* need not be posited. Even those who hold *jāti* to be something distinct, admit that there is such a thing as form.

When *samsthāna* is said to constitute the *pravṛtti-nimitta* of a word what is really meant is this. At the time the second, third or subsequent instance of a class is perceived, there is, in addition to the awareness of the *samsthāna* of that *vyakti*, the recollection of closely similar instances perceived before and their samsthānas. The samsthāna perceived together with those recalled constitutes the pravṛtti-nimitta. Any one of these taken in isolation cannot serve as a pravṛtti-nimitta. Hence, the charge that there would be a plurality of pravṛtti-nimittas for each word falls to the ground. Since objects belonging to different classes (e.g. *go* and *gavaya*, or cat and tiger) may exhibit structural similarity, it will not do to say that having a similar samsthāna is the pravṛitti-nimitta of a word. Hence the insistence on 'very close similarity in structure'. Otherwise, there is the danger of mixing up objects resembling one another only remotely. That the samsthāna of different classes of objects admits of several degrees of similarity has to be accepted by those who believe *jāti* to be a distinct category; otherwise they cannot satisfactorily explain why, for example, *gotva* is not present in the *gavaya*.

By samsthāna is meant the peculiar or distinctive structure or pattern of anything. In the case of objects endowed with form, the con-

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

junction of the several component parts constitutes the samsthāna. E.g. the collection of the dewlap is the samsthāna of the cow. But in the case of formless entities, their peculiar properties (*asādhāraṇa-dharma*), which mark them off from other things, constitute the samsthāna. E.g., *jñāna* and other qualities of the soul form its *samsthāna*.

The doctrine identifying *sāmānya* with *samsthāna* has not only the merit of economy of thought (*lāghava*), but has also the support of the scriptures. The famous *Chāndogya* text, 'eka vijñānēna sarva vijñānam', teaching sat-kārya-vāda shows unambiguously that effects, e.g., pots, cups, plates and so forth, are in substance one with their cause, namely clay. The underlying substance being unitary, the plurality of bases required for positing jāti does not exist. Hence it is concluded that sāmānya and samsthāna are identical.

10. *Śakti-Vāda.*

The tenth chapter takes up the question whether śakti (potentiality) should be recognised or not, and answers it in the affirmative, after refuting the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments in favour of the opposite view. In this regard the Viśiṣṭādvaitin is at one with the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras. The Nyāya denial of śakti as a separate entity is mainly based on the following considerations.

1. The absence of the effect when apparently all the causal factors are present is explicable, it is sometimes said, only on the hypothesis that the śakti present in the cause is rendered inoperative by counter-agents (*pratibandhaka*). Rather than positing a śakti and saying that it is counter-acted by impediments it would be more reasonable, says the Nyāya-Viśeṣika, to trace the absence of the effect to the absence of one of the elements constituting the full complement of causal factors (*kāraṇa-sāmagri*). The absence of counteracting circumstances (*pratibandhakābhāva*) is an essential factor included in the totality of causal conditions. Hence, in its absence (i.e. when counter-acting forces prevail), the effect cannot occur. The mere presence of fire, for example, does not suffice to account for burning. There is need of the negative factor, namely, the absence of counter agents. That is why in the presence of *maṇi* (a gem which is fire-proof) fire fails to burn objects.

2. The believer in śakti as a distinct category cannot give a consistent account of its origin. For, when counter-acting circumstances destroy śakti, it is possible to revive it with the aid of the *uttambaka* (factors that could override the counter-agents). In such a situation, he must treat the *uttambaka* as the cause of *śakti*. But when both the *pratibandhaka* and the *uttambaka* are absent, he must maintain that the very thing which causes an object also generates its *śakti*.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

Since the effect may quite well occur even in the presence of the *pratibandhaka*, provided it is associated with the *uttambaka*, the negative condition may be expressed in more comprehensive terms as follows: "The absence of the pratibandhaka which is not associated with the uttambaka (uttambhakābhāva-viśiṣṭa-pratibandhakābhāva)."

This view of śakti is subjected to severe scrutiny, and it is first pointed out that the negative factor, 'absence of the pratibandhaka' cannot be included among the causal conditions; for it will be shown presently that significant negation is never purely negative, but always carries a positive import. Again, if the absence of the pratibandhaka is an essential causal factor, it must, with consistency, be maintained that the absence of the person who could apply the pratibandhaka is also a causal condition; for, equally with the pratibandhaka, the person bringing it into operation prevents the occurrence of the effect. Not only that; but the uttambaka also must be included in the cause; for it overrules the pratibandhaka and facilitates the occurrence of the effect. If it is said that it cannot be a causal factor, because it is not invariable (i.e., in its absence too the effect occurs, on the strength of the absence of the pratibandhaka), the answer is that the effect produced by the uttambaka and that produced by the absence of the pratibandhaka are distinct from each other; even as the fire generated by rubbing *araṇi* sticks must be distinguished from that produced by *maṇi* (the lens), or straw. Thus, there are difficulties in including a negative circumstance among the causal factors.

Secondly, if a negative circumstance must be treated as a cause, when there are alternate causes for the same effect (when araṇi sticks or mani (lens) or tṛṇa (straw) can produce fire), instead of admitting differences in the effects produced by them, you might as well account for the fire arising from any of these causes by the single negative formula, namely, 'the absence of the non-existence of maṇi qualified by the absence of araṇi and tṛṇa'.

If the causal factor is expressed in this negative fashion when a positive formulation is possible, universally accepted inferences, such as the inference of smoke from fire, would be upset and it would be impossible to infer causes from a consideration of effects. The point of the criticism could be brought out with the aid of the following illustration. While common-sense thinks that fire is the cause of smoke, it is 'the absence of the non-existence of fire qualified in a specific way'. If the Naiyāyika is right, smoke must be inferred even when fire is absent; for when there is *vanyabhāva*, this causal condition is fulfilled (i.e. there is the absence of the non-existence of fire thus qualified). And if smoke could arise even in the absence of fire, the every day inference of fire from smoke would fall to the ground. Hence it has to be concluded

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melkote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

that only positive entities endowed with potency can be treated as causes. The tendency to make an object of this *śakti* must be resisted. Each object has a two-fold aspect—a perceptible and an imperceptible (latent) aspect. *Śakti* is to be identified with the latter aspect.

11. *Bhāvāntarābhāva-vāda*

In this chapter the Nyāya conception of *abhāva* (non-existence, negation) is criticised and the view that *abhāva* is not distinct from, and is merely a variety of, *bhāva* (existence, affirmation) is upheld. The *pūrvapakṣin* says non-existence is relative in its conception. Negation is of something or other, and never absolute nothing (*śūnya*), which is merely a meaningless concept. One may speak of the non-existence of a jar or cloth, but never of mere non-existence. Again, non-existence is expressible by negative judgments involving the use of the negative particle *na*. But the idea of existence is conveyed by affirmative judgments, and it does not presuppose a *pratiyogin* (counter-correlative). How, it is asked, can non-existence with its dependence upon the *pratiyogin* be treated as being on a par with *bhāva* which does not presuppose the *pratiyogin* ?

If the objector says that the expresion *nāsti* (does not exist) does not purport to convey the idea of non-existence, but really aims at denoting the presence of an *upādhi* (something positive), he must explain what precisely that *upādhi* is. Is it the bare region (*deśa*), or its awareness, or bare time, or space in association with time ? On the first alternative, as the region (e.g. *bhūtala*) exists even in the presence of the *pratiyogin* (e.g. the jar), one must speak of the object as non-existent. Should it be said that mention of non-existence arises only when the *pratiyogin* is absent, it may be replied that, so long as the concept of *abhāva* is not admitted, there is no basis for speaking of *pratiyogin* at all. In fact, it is only from negative statements, such as 'There is no jar on the ground', 'This is not a cloth' that we come to speak of the jar or the cloth as the *pratiyogin*. It is no argument to say that an object comes to be regarded as a *pratiyogin*, not because of its non-existence, but because it is not adjacent; for 'not adjacent' (*asannihita*) itself involves a negative element. Thus the concept of non-existence is inescapable. The objector might still argue that an object could be treated as a *pratiyogin*, not because it is *asannihita* (not close by), but because it is in contact with a different region. This attempt to explain the *pratiyogin* on a purely positive basis, without referring to *abhāva* at all, is futile; because, if contact with a different region suffices to make anything a *pratiyogin*, then all-pervasive substances such as ākāśa would come to be treated as the *pratiyogin*. In other words, if the existence of the jar elsewhere suggests the judgment 'There is no jar on this spot',

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

the contact of *ākāśa* with a different region should lead to the judgment 'There is no *ākāśa* here'. The second alternative which identifies the *upādhi* with cognition of space fares no better; for cognition, being momentary, cannot be regarded as non-existence, because it is recognised on all hands that reciprocal non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*) is eternal. Nor can the expression *nāsti* denote *kāla* (time); for time being present universally in an identical form there would be no point in the negative judgment referring to the existence of bare duration.

The last alternative which says that *nāsti* denotes space associated with time is open to all the objections to which the first and second alternatives are liable. As the expression *nāsti* cannot be said to refer only to some *upādhi*, be it *deśa* or *kāla* or both, and as it is open to perception, it must be recognised, say the Naiyāyikas, that *abhāva* is a distinct category.

In disproof of this theory the author first urges that it is liable to be charged with the defect of multiplying entities. As the negative judgment may well be said to refer to particular spaces, instants of time and states associated with the cognition of the *pratiyogin*, it is needless to posit abhāva as a separate category. He who accepts abhāva as a different category thinks that non-existence relates to a particular place and time. For the sake of economy of thought the *siddhāntin* considers the very place and time as the significance of the negative judgment. Again, if the *siddhāntin* is guilty of treating what is negative as though it were positive, the opponent is equally guilty of the same mistake. Does he not say that *abhāvābhāva* (the negation of a negation) is positive? Even as the Naiyāyika does not treat *dhvaṁsa-prāgabhāva* as another kind of non-existence different from the four varieties already admitted and tries to show that it amounts only to the existence of the jar or its posterior non-existence, and just as he does not treat *prāgabhāva-dvaṁsa* (the subsequent non-existence of posterior non-existence) as being other than the jar or its subsequent non-existence, even so the siddhāntin says that the posterior non-existence of the pot amounts to the unending series of previous states, and subsequent non-existence is merely the unending series of successive states. If it be said that the Naiyāyika draws the line at these four varieties and refuses to admit further kinds of *abhāva* only for fear of being landed in an infinite regress, it could be said that it would be more sensible not to admit a few varieties and refuse to go further. Hence it is but reasonable to maintain that *prāgabhāva* is only another name for the unending series of previous states, and *dhvaṁsa* as the name for the unending series of subsequent states. If this theory is borne in mind, the scriptural passage "In the beginning this was non-existent (*asat*)" could be assigned its primary meaning.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

12. *Śarīra-lakṣaṇa-vāda.*

The most prominent among the doctrines that differentiate Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta from all other schools of Vedāntic thought is its view that the entire cosmos comprising souls and matter constitutes the body (*śarīra*) of Brahman. For understanding the exact significance of this description of the cosmos it is necessary to know what precisely is meant by the term *śarira* (body). In the *Srī Bhāṣya* the body is defined as follows—"that substance which, in respect of the activities in which it can engage, is capable of being completely controlled and supported by a conscious entity, and whose nature consists in being a source of glorification to that conscious entity is the body of that conscious entity." The question raised in this chapter is: Is this a single definition, or a collection of three definitions?

The *pūrvapakṣin* prefers the latter alternative, because he thinks that the three points mentioned in the definition *dhāryatva, niyantṛtva* and *śeṣatva* are not at once necessary, and that any one of them suffices for making anything a body. He thinks that it can be resolved into the following three definitions.—(i) That substance which, in respect of the activities in which it can engage, is capable of being controlled by a conscious entity, is the body of that conscious entity. (ii) That substance which is supported by a conscious entity is the body of the latter. (iii) That substance whose nature consists in being a source of glorification to that conscious entity is the body of the latter. A close examination of these alternative definitions reveals that each word therein has a definite function to fulfil and none is superfluous. Take the first definition. But for the word *cetanasya* (conscious entity), *dharmabhūtajñāna* (attributive consciousness) would have to be regarded as the body of the soul. For *dhārmabhūtajñāna* is controlled by the soul in itself, and not by the soul endowed with consciousness. The term *dravya* (substance) clearly shows that all other categories, such as attribute (*guṇa*), and activity (*karma*), cannot be treated as bodies. From the qualification *sarvātmanā* (always), it follows that the body of another, which a person may occasionally control, cannot be treated as his own body. The expression *svārthe*, meaning in respect of the activities in which it can engage, shows that the body cannot be controlled in regard to activities which lie beyond its powers. The human body, for instance, cannot be expected to fly. 'Capable of being controlled' (*śakyam*) suggests that the control need not always be exercised. In the second definition, the term *sarvātmanā* (always) precludes the possibility of our treating anything as the body which we may occasionally support. Similarly, in the last definition the word *sarvātmanā* serves to exclude the possibility of our treating servants and others, who occasionally minister unto their master, as body.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

The view advocated here is that it is a single definition; for each of these three parts of the definition, taken in itself is found to be defective in some respect or other. Take the first definition which asserts that any substance can be treated as a body if it is capable of being controlled by a conscious entity in regard to activities which it can perform. This definition is liable to be charged with the defect of being too broad (*ativyāpti*). If this definition were acceptable, the axe would have to be regarded as the body of the person wielding it, since it fulfils the requirements of this definition. On rigorous scrutiny, the other two definitions are likewise found to be severally defective. Hence, it follows that *ādheyatva, vidheyatva* and *śeṣatva* are all essential elements in the definition of the body. That this is so would follow from a close study of the celebrated Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa where the doctrine that the universe is the body of God is clearly formulated. Take for example the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text: "He who stands in the earth (*pṛthvī*), who is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is and who controls it from within—He is thy Self, the Inner Controller, the Immortal." Here the expression "He who stands in the earth and who is within the earth" teaches ādheyatva. By suggesting that 'the earth does not know Him' (i.e., does not know that it exists for the sake of the Indweller), *śeṣatva* is indicated. "Who controlls from within' emphasises *vidheyatva.*

13. *Kaivalya-vicāra.*

Is it at all possible for the soul whose intrinsic nature is to be self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) to be entangled in *samsāra*? What precisely is the nature of *kaivalya*? These are the two questions raised in this chapter. Those who object to our view may argue that the soul (ātman) is, in its essential nature, blissful (*svatassukhī*) and self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*); and that there is therefore no possibility of its ever being involved in the miseries of earthly existence. They might also consider it impossible that when the blissful nature of the self is clouded, it should come to be implicated in matter. For, they may ask, "Will not the obscuration of the nature of the self-luminous entity amount to its destruction (*svarūpanāśa*)? How could the Viśiṣṭādvaitin object to the advaitic view and say that if *māyā* were to cloud *ātman,* the latter would be destroyed thereby; when the same objection would apply with equal force to his own contention?"

The author's reply to this objection is that on the advaitic conception *ātman* is a *nirviśeṣa-vastu,* pure consciousness, and, hence, with the obscuration of this consciousness, its very nature is in danger of being destroyed; but that, on the *viśiṣṭādvaitic* theory, the *ātman* is *saviśeṣa* (endowed with qualities). Among other things its essential nature, viz., *jñāna,* is the most agreeable kind (*anukūla*). This *ānukūlya* admits of several degrees, and is always present in some degree, however slight. Hence the soul does not run the risk of being destroyed. When *ānukūlya*

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

is present only in slight degrees, it is self-revealed, but is unable to arrest samsāric life. *Ānukūlya* of the most intense degree is apprehended from the scriptures. When it is veiled by *karma* and thereby reduced in intensity, mundane existence arises.

In the state of *kaivalya* (realisation of the nature of one's own self) the *Antaryāmin* (the Indweller) shines forth, but not as being the object of the utmost enjoyment. True, even the aspirant after self-realisation (*kaivalya, ātmāvalokana*) has to follow the path of self-surrender (*prapatti*) or loving devotion to God (*bhakti*) in order to remove the obstacles standing in the way of the successful fruition of *karma* and *jñāna*, the direct means to *kaivalya*. The devotion involved here is, however, only a means to an end (*aupādhika*). Long after *kaivalya* has been attained a person may experience *bhakti* in the true sense of the term as a result of either direct perception of the spotless nature of the self (*ātman*), or the merit accumulated through countless births. Thus the essentially blissful nature of the Lord is experienced in the fullest measure only in the state of final release (*mokṣa*), and not in the penultimate state (i.e. *kaivalya*). Hence the distinction between *kaivalya* and *mokṣa*. Though the former falls short of the ideal state, it may justifiably be spoken of as release; for in *kaivalya* the soul has experience of its own blissful nature, has no births and deaths and has obtained complete freedom from all bondage to *karma* which is the root cause of all the pleasures and pains of worldly life.

Since the thought of the Lord's blissful nature does not enter into the meditation (*upāsana*) of a person who has set up *kaivalya* as his goal, when his *upāsana* bears fruit he has an intuitive perception of the Lord, but does not yet grasp His blissful nature in accordance with what is known as *tatkratunyāya*. The case is otherwise with the person who meditates upon the Lord as a blissful entity.

Bhagavad Rāmānuja, however, does not countenance the view that in the state of *kaivalya* the person is denied *Brahmānanda-anubhava*, and is confined only to *Brahmānubhava* or the direct perception of the Lord. For the realisation of one's own nature must, certainly, at some stage include the realisation that one exists only for the sake of the Lord. This must inevitably lead up to a fuller experience of the blissful nature of the Supreme Self. Since the scriptures say that he who follows the *arcirādi-mārga* is led up to the final goal, there is no warrant, he says, for asserting that the person aspiring for *kaivalya* is for ever condemned to an inferior type of *mokṣa*. In short, the distinction between these two forms of release may be expressed thus:—The soul may carry on meditation (*upāsana*) in one of two ways: It may meditate either on Brahman having the soul for its body or on the soul having Brahman for its self. The first type of meditation leads the *upāsaka* straight to *mokṣa*; the second leads up to it only after having traversed the stage of *kaivalya*.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melkote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

श्रीः

॥ श्रीमते रामानुजाय नमः ॥

॥ भूमिका ॥

श्रीमन्न्यायकुलिशाभिधानं प्रबन्धरत्नमिदं जयति सर्वस्वमिव श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमुनिप्रतिष्ठापितस्य विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धान्तस्य । प्रणेता चास्य विश्वविख्यातकीर्तेः कवितार्किकसिंहस्य, सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रस्य, श्रीमद्वेङ्कटनाथस्य वेदान्ताचार्यदेशिकमणेराचार्यो मातुलश्चआत्रेयरामानुजगुरुः ; यस्यानितरसाधारणं वादाहवकौशलमध्यक्षितवद्भिस्तदानीन्तनबुधवरैर्वितीर्णं प्रशस्तिनाम 'वादिहंसाम्बुवाह' इति ।

आचार्यवर्योऽयं श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमुनेरन्तरङ्गशिष्यस्य 'यतीन्द्र माहानसिक' इति 'घटाम्बु' इति च आचार्यदास्यविशेषनाम्ना विश्रुतस्य आत्रेयस्य प्रणतार्तिहराचार्यस्य नप्ता, रामानुजाचार्यस्य पौत्रः, श्रीपद्मनाभाचार्यस्य पुत्रश्चेति—

'दुर्मोचोद्भटकर्मकोटिनिबिडोऽप्यादेशवश्यः कृतः
बाह्यैर्नैव विमोहितोऽस्मि कुदृशां पक्षैर्न विक्षोभितः ।
यो माहानसिको महान् यतिपतेर्नीतश्च तत्पौत्रजा-
नाचार्यानिति रङ्गधुर्य ! मयि ते स्वल्पावशिष्टो भरः, ॥'

इति श्रीमन्निगमान्तमहादेशिकसूक्त्या अन्यैश्च सम्प्रदायवचनैस्स्फुटमवगम्यते ।

'नमो रामानुजार्याय वेदान्तार्थप्रदायिने ।
आत्रेयपद्मनाभार्यसुताय गुणशालिने ॥'

इति सम्प्रदायागतं वचनमप्यस्य पद्मनाभार्यः पितेति सुस्पष्टमवबोधयति । अयमाचार्य एवात्र प्रतिवादमन्ते स्वपितृपादनामधेयं श्रीपद्मनाभार्य इति निर्दिशति ।

---

१. न्यासतिलके—श्लो 9.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

'चैत्रार्द्रासम्भवं काञ्च्यां रङ्गराजगुरोस्सुतम् ।
सुप्रतिष्ठांशमात्रेयं रामानुजगुरुं भजे ॥'

इति सम्प्रतिपन्नवचनान्तरदर्शनादेतत्पितृ रङ्गराजार्य इति नामान्तरमप्यस्तीति विज्ञायते ।

गुरुरसौ स्वपितुरात्रेयरङ्गराजाचार्यस्य सकाशान्मन्त्रमन्त्रार्थान्, वात्स्यवरदगुरोस्सकाशाच्छ्रीभाष्यादिकांश्च ग्रन्थानध्यगीष्टेत्यविगीता सम्प्रदायसरणिः ।

सर्वेष्वपि तन्त्रेषु निरावाधं पन्थानमवगन्तुमलङ्कर्मीणोऽसौ स्वाचार्यवरदगुरोरादेशेन प्रियभागिनेयस्य श्रीमद्वेङ्कटनाथस्य सकलाः कला उपदिश्य तमेतं विंशाव्द एव विश्रुतनानाविधविद्यमकरोत् । अयमर्थः—

'श्रीमद्भ्यां स्यादसावित्यनुपधि वरदाचार्यरामानुजाभ्यां
सम्यग्दृष्टेन सर्वं सह निशितधिया वेङ्कटेशेन कृप्तः ।'

इति अधिकरणसारावळीग्रन्थोपक्रमश्लोकेन,

'श्रुत्वा रामानुजार्यात्सदसदपि ततस्तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापं
व्यातानीद्वेङ्कटेशो वरदगुरुकृपालम्भितोद्दामभूमा ।'

इति तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापप्रारम्भसूक्त्या, मीमांसापादुकोपक्रमगतेन

'यस्मादस्माभिरेतद्यतिपतिकथितप्राक्तनप्रक्रियोद्य-
त्कर्मब्रह्मावमर्शप्रमवबहुफलं सार्थमग्राहि शास्त्रम् ।
तं विश्वग्मेदविद्यास्थितिपदविषयस्येयभूतं प्रभूत्तं
वन्देयात्रेयरामानुजगुरुमनघं वादिहंसाम्बुवाहम् ॥'

1- भाषायामस्य கடாதூர் அம்மாள் इति प्रसिद्धिः.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

इति मङ्गळपद्येन 'विंशत्यब्दे विश्रुतनानाविधविद्य' इति सङ्कल्पसूयोदयवाक्येन च तत्र तत्र स्फुटमवगम्यते।

अस्य च 'अप्पिळ्ळार्' इति भाषाव्यवहारोऽपि जागर्ति। अदसीयं सकलासु कलासु विलक्षणं वैचक्षण्यं साक्षात्कृतवन्तस्तदानीन्तना महान्तः 'श्रीभाष्यकारप्रियशिष्यः 'पिळ्ळान्' इति प्रसिद्धः कुरुकेशः स एव वासाविव्युत्प्रैक्षिषत। ततः प्रभृतीदं प्रशस्तिनाम आसीदिति तत्त्वविदां साम्प्रदायिको निर्णयः।

तस्यैतस्य वादिहंसाम्बुवाहस्य प्रपितामहानां प्रभावमेवं वर्णयन्ति साम्प्रदायिकाः। कदाचिच्छ्रीभाष्यकारस्य रामानुजमुनेर्भिक्षावसरे विषसम्मिश्रान्नदानेन तं लोकान्तरं प्रापयितुं केचिच्छठाः प्रायतन्त। तामेतां तेषां प्रवृत्तिमुपलभ्य ससंभ्रमं श्रीभाष्यकारगुरवस्तत्र समागताः। शिष्यकोटिभिः परिवृतं रामानुजमुनिं जीवन्तं पश्यन्तोऽमन्दमानन्दमलभन्त। तत्र चासङ्ख्येयेषु शिष्यजनेषु प्रणतार्तिहरार्यस्य श्रीभाष्यकारशरीरेऽतिशयितं प्रेमातिशयं बहुधा परीक्ष्य तमेतं तस्यान्तरङ्गकैङ्कर्येषु न्ययूयुजन्। ततः प्रभृति श्रीभाष्यकारस्य घटतीर्थाहरणादिकमन्तरङ्गकैङ्कर्यं कुर्वाणोऽयं 'घटाम्बु' इति विरुदमलभत। त एते वादिहंसाम्बुवाहस्य प्रपितामहाः श्रीमत्प्रणतार्तिहराचार्याः श्रीभाष्यकारस्य प्रियशिष्यास्त्वीयेन पाण्डित्यप्रकर्षेण 'वेदान्तोदयन' इति प्रसिद्धिमासादितवन्तो विशिष्टाद्वैतसम्प्रदायं बहुधा तत्र तत्र प्रवर्तयन्तो व्यराजन्त इति। अत एव श्रीमन्निगमान्तमहादेशिकाः—

'इति यतिराजमहानसपरिमळपरिवाहवासितां पिबत।
विबुधपरिषन्निषेव्यां वेदान्तोदयनसम्प्रदायसुधाम्॥'

इति तस्यैतस्य सम्प्रदायस्य यतिराजमहानसपरिमळवासितत्वेन बुधजननिषेव्यतां वर्णयन्ति।

एतस्यैव चाचार्यवर्यस्यानवद्ये वंशे कृतावतारासुप्रसिद्धवैभवा गोपालार्यमहादेशिकाः कुम्भघोणे विरचितनिवासाश्श्रीमतां ज्ञानानुष्ठानवैराग्यशेवधीनां 'साक्षात्स्वामी'

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

इति जगति विख्यातानां न्यासविद्यादर्पणश्रीतत्त्वसिद्धाञ्जनादिग्रन्थनिर्माणेन विशिष्टाद्वैत-सिद्धान्तस्य बहूपकृतवतां श्रीमद्वेदान्तरामानुजमहादेशिकानां वरिवस्यया अधिगतसकल-वेदान्ततत्त्वार्थाः, पाण्डित्यानुष्ठानवैराग्यादिभिराचार्यताप्रयोजकैर्गुणगणैः 'अपरोऽयं निग-मान्तमहादेशिकस्यावतारः' इति तदानीन्तनैर्बुधवरैरुत्प्रेक्षिताः, तत्त्वार्थाधिजिगमिषया शिष्यवृत्त्या स्वीयं पादमूलमासेदुषां वेदान्तरामानुजमहादेशिकादीनां त्रयाणामुत्तमाश्रमिणां वेदान्तार्थानुपदिश्य तन्मुखेन विशिष्टाद्वैतसम्प्रदायमविच्छिन्नमद्य यावत्प्रवर्तितवन्तो, निक्षे-पचिन्तामण्यादिग्रन्थानां विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धान्तसमर्थनपराणां रचयितारश्च, गुरुपङ्क्तिहार-यष्टेरनर्घं नायकरत्नमिव विराजन्ते[1]। विश्वगुणादर्शादिप्रबन्धनिर्मातारः श्लेषयमकचक्र-वर्तिनः श्रीवेङ्कटाध्वरिणोऽप्यस्यैवाचार्यमणेर्वंशे समजनिषतेति तत्सन्ततिगता वंशावळि-रवबोधयति।

भगवतः श्रीभाष्यकारादनन्तरं प्रणतार्तिहराचार्यस्तत्पुत्रपौत्रप्रपौत्राश्चेति चत्वार एते आत्रेया महानुभावा आचार्यपङ्क्तिमलङ्कुर्वन्तीति नेदं सम्प्रदायज्ञानां पुरस्तादिदम्प्रथम-मावेदनीयम्। तस्यैतस्य वादिहंसाम्बुवाहस्य वरदार्यो रङ्गराजार्य इति पुत्रद्वयमासीदिति तत्सन्ततिसमुद्भवास्समुदाहरन्ति।

'न्यायकुलिशादिग्रन्थत्रयकर्तारः' इति तद्वंश्यैस्तत्र तत्र पठ्यमानं तदीयं प्रशस्तिपत्रमावेदयत्यन्यच्च ग्रन्थद्वयं नूनमनेन विरचितमिति। परन्तु किं तद्ग्रन्थद्वयमिति नाद्य यावन्निश्चेतुं शक्यते। हन्त—महदिदं विषादस्थानम्! यत् श्रीभगवद्रामानुजसि-द्धान्तस्य अथवा सर्वस्य सिद्धान्तस्य यद्बहवः प्राचामाचार्याणां वाग्विस्तरा एतर्हि श्रोतुमपि दुर्लभतां गमिता इति।

---

(१) तानेतानाचार्यानधिकृत्य श्लोकोऽयमनुसन्धीयते—
यः श्रीशो भुवि वादिहंसजलमुग्वंशेऽवतीर्णोऽखिलान्
श्रीकृष्णाध्वरिदेशिकात्समवितुम् गोपालसूर्यात्मना।
शिष्यैः सूरिगणैः श्रितः सुविमलैर्वेदान्तरामानुज-
श्रीरङ्गशरमानिवासयतिराण्मुख्यैस्स जीयाद् गुरुः॥

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

श्रीमन्निगमान्तमहादेशिकाः 'वादिहंसाम्बुवाहाश्शुकवन्मामशिक्षयन्' इति 'तैर्मम हृदि लिखितं पत्रे लिखामि' इति च वर्णयन्तस्स्वीयां निरतिशयां गुरुभक्तिं प्रकाशयन्ति।

विस्मरणार्हस्य दुरवगाहस्याप्यर्थस्याक्लेशेन शिष्यजनहृदयेषु समुचितैरुदाहरणैर्दृढप्रतिष्ठापनेऽस्य वादिहंसाम्बुवाहस्यानितरसाधारणं नैपुण्यमासीदिति नेदमविदितं रहस्यत्रयसारादिग्रन्थाध्येतॄणां विदुषाम्। तत्र द्वित्राण्युदाहरणानि प्रदर्श्यन्ते—

'अग्रतः प्रययौ रामस्सीता मध्ये सुमध्यमा
पृष्ठतस्तु धनुष्पाणिर्लक्ष्मणोऽनुजगाम ह॥

इति श्रीमद्रामायणपद्यमुदाहृत्य श्लोकोऽयं प्रणवस्य यथाक्रमं परतत्त्वपुरुषकारचेतनप्रतिपादनपरस्यार्थानुसन्धाने सुकर उपायः। तथा अर्जुनरथः पुरतस्सारथिं परमात्मानं पश्चादर्जुनञ्च चेतनं बिभ्राणः प्रणवार्थानुसन्धानस्याक्लिष्ट उपाय इति वादिहंसाम्बुवाहोपदेश इति वेदान्तगुरवैः। काव्यरसिकता कथमेषामुपयुज्यत इति सहृदयाः परामृशन्तु। तथा ये भगवतः परत्वमात्रमालोच्य सौलभ्यमजानन्तस्तस्माद्दूरीभवितुं प्रयतन्ते, तेभ्यो 'नराधमाः' इति गीताचार्यैर्निन्दितेभ्यस्सौलभ्यमात्रवेदिनो ये गोपीवद्विवेकशून्या अपि

---

(१) இப்படி.....கீழும் மேலுமுள்ள பாசுரங்களெல்லாம் வேதாந்தோதயன ஸம்பிரதாயமான மடப்பள்ளிவார்த்தையை ஆசார்யன் பக்கலிலே தாங்கேட்டருளினபடியே கிடாம்பியப்புள்ளாரடியேகீக் கிளியைப் பழக்குவிக்குமாப்போலே பழக்குவிக்க அவர் திருவுள்ளத்திலிசக்கமடியாகப் பெருமாள் தெளியப்பிரகாசிப்பித்து மறவாமற்காத்துப் பிழையறப் பேசுவித்த பாசுரங்கள். रहस्यत्रयसारे.

வெள்ளப்பரிமுகர் தேசிகராய் விரகாலடியோம். உள்ளத்தெழுதிய தோலிபிலிட்டனம். रहस्यत्रयसारे—निगमनाधिकारे.

(२) இதில் ப்ரதமபதத்தில் அர்த்தங்களே அர்ஜுனரதத்திலும், 'अग्रतः प्रययौ रामः' என்ற சுலோகத்திலும் கண்டு கொள்வது.....இது .....அர்த்தாநுஸந்தானத்திற்குக் குறிப்பாக வப்புள்ளாருளிச்செய்த விரகு. रहस्यत्रयसारे—प्रधानप्रतितन्त्राधिकारे.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

सन्तो भगवन्तमुपजिगमिषन्ति, ते परमास्तिकाः श्लाघ्यतमा इति वादिहंसाम्बुवाहानामुक्तिरिति निगमान्तमहादेशिकाः[1]।

एतस्य देशकालनिर्णयश्च शिष्यप्रशिष्यक्रमागतस्सुगम एव। तथा हि—एतद्वागिनेयस्य शिष्यस्य च श्रीमद्वेदान्तदेशिकस्य क्रैस्तववर्षे सप्तत्युत्तरद्विशताधिकसहस्रतमे (1270) आविर्भाव इति विमर्शकानां निर्णयः। अतः क्रैस्तवत्रयोदशशतकेऽस्यापि स्थितिरासीदिति निश्चीयते। 'चैत्रार्द्रासम्भवं काव्यम्' इत्यादिभिर्वचनैश्श्रीकाञ्चीक्षेत्रे विक्रमवर्षेचैत्रार्द्रायामस्याविर्भाव इति सम्प्रदायक्रमागतो निर्णयः।

तस्यैतस्य प्रज्ञानिधेराचार्यस्य स्वप्रतिभाद्रविणनिक्षेपायमाणं न्यायकुलिशाभिधानं निबन्धनमिदमेतत्प्रियशिष्येण वेदान्तगुरुणा न्यायपरिशुद्धयादौ तत्र तत्रोदाहृतमास्ते।

यथा न्यायपरिशुद्धावनुमानाध्याये केवलव्यतिरेकिभङ्गे[2] 'उक्तञ्च न्यायकुलिशे स्वप्रकाशवादे श्रीमद्रामानुजाचार्यैः—'न च सिद्धान्तिनोऽयं प्रसङ्गः; केवलव्यतिरेकिप्रामाण्यानभ्युपगमात्' इति। एवमत्रैवाध्याये चतुर्थाह्निके 'पाणिपादादिषु प्रत्येकसमुदायाहंत्वविकल्पानुपपत्त्यादयश्चास्मदाचार्यैर्न्यायकुलिशे प्रपञ्चिताः प्रस्पष्टमनुसन्धेयाः'[3] इति च। न्यायसिद्धाञ्जने बुद्धिपरिच्छेदेऽपि 'उक्तञ्च न्यायकुलिशे। संयोगस्तु प्रसरणवैभवादिप्रतिपादकशास्त्रबलादाश्रित इति[4]।'"

यदेव यावदेव श्रीमन्निगमान्तगुरुणा क्वचित्क्वचिदुदाहृतवाक्यशकलं तदतिरिक्तं कियदपि न केवलमस्माकं व्याख्यातृणामपि पूर्वेषां दृष्टिविषयभूतं नासीदियन्तमपि कालम्।

---

(१) இவ்விடத்தில் ஸர்வேசுவரனுடைய பரத்வமாத்திரத்தை யறிந்தகலுகையாலே நாதமனென்று பேர்பெற்ற பிறந்து கெட்டானிற் காட்டில் இடைச்சிகளோப் போலே விவேகமில்லையேயாகிலும் ஸௌலப்யத்தையறிந்து அந்தலனுடையொருவனே ஸஜாகுமவனே பரமாஸ்திகனென்றப்புள்ளாரருளிச்செய்யும் பாசுரம். रहस्यत्रयसारे—परिकरविभागाधिकारे.

(२) न्यायपरि P. 66

(३) ,, P. 185

(४) न्यायसिद्धा. P. 269.

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

अत इदं निबन्धनं नाममात्रशेषमासीदिति मन्यमानानां विद्याव्यसनिनां दुनोति स्म मानसम् । तदिदानीं 'यदा मृतस्य संप्राप्तिः' इत्युक्तरीत्या लब्धप्रचारमस्माकं परमं प्रीणयति मनः । अत्र न केवलं विशिष्टाद्वैतिनां, सर्वेषामपि वैदिकमतस्थानामुपजीव्यास्सिद्धार्थव्युत्पत्तिसमर्थनस्वतःप्रामाण्यवर्णनादयो बहवो विषया उपलभ्यन्ते ।

एतद्ग्रन्थस्यातीव दुरवगाहत्वं समुचितोपकारविशेषश्च प्रबन्धादौ ग्रन्थकृतैव प्रतिपाद्यते । यथा—

'अभेद्यं सर्वेषां हतकुमतिगोत्रप्रसरणं
यतीन्द्रादेशैकप्रवणसुमनस्त्राणनिपुणम् ।

कठोरेष्वात्रेयान्वयतिलकरामानुजकृतं
कथायुद्धेष्वाविष्कुरुत निशितं न्यायकुलिशम्' ॥

इति । अतोऽत्र दुर्ग्रहाणां वादार्थानां सर्वेषां सुग्रहत्वाय वादार्थसारस्सङ्गृह्यते । अस्मिन्निबन्धने संहत्य त्रयोदश वादाः ।

तत्र प्रथमे सिद्धार्थव्युत्पत्तिसमर्थनवादे वेदान्तवाक्यानां सिद्धे ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यसिद्धयर्थं सर्वशब्दानां कार्य एव व्युत्पत्तिं वदन् प्राभाकरो व्युदस्यते ।

स ह्येवम्मनुते—सिद्धे व्युत्पत्तिर्न भवितुमर्हति । शिक्षको जनः पित्रादिः कञ्चित्कालं अङ्गुळिनिर्देशपूर्वकं तत्तच्छब्दांस्तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु प्रयुङ्क्ते । चेष्टापरिज्ञानवान् व्युत्पित्सुर्व्युत्पादकानां प्रवृत्तिं व्युत्पादनार्थां जानाति । ततश्चेष्टामन्तरेण केवलशब्देनापि स्वस्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिं दृष्ट्वा शब्दार्थयोस्संबन्धान्तरादर्शनात्परिशेषाद्बोध्यबोधकभावसम्बन्धेनैव अयं शब्द इममर्थं बोधयति' इति व्युत्पद्यत इति हि सिद्धार्थे व्युत्पत्तिर्वक्तव्या । सा तु न सङ्गच्छते । अङ्गुळिनिर्देशस्थले शब्दोऽर्थवद्बोध्यकोटौ निविशते ? उत निर्देशवद्बोधककोटौ? इति विशये, निर्देशस्य बोधकताया उभयसम्प्रतिपन्नत्वात्तेनैव प्रतिपन्ने वस्तुनि शब्दस्याप्युपायत्वकल्पने प्रयोजनाभावादर्थवद्बोध्य एव शब्दः, न तु बोधक इतिनिर्णीयते ।

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

किञ्चाङ्गुलिनिर्देशेन प्रत्येकपदार्थव्युत्पादने शब्दानां प्रत्येकमर्थेषु सङ्गतिग्रहादितरान्वितार्थ एव शक्तिरिति सिद्धान्तोऽपि विरुद्धयेत । अतो 'गामानय' इत्यादिवृद्धव्यवहारेण व्युत्पत्तिबीजभूतेन कार्यान्वित एव शक्तिग्रहात्सिद्धार्थे शक्तिर्नास्तीति ।

सिद्धान्तस्तु—व्युत्पादकस्य प्रयोजनाभिसन्धिनैव चेष्टया सह शब्दप्रयोगः । तत्रार्थस्य बोध्यत्वे हानोपादानादिरूपं प्रयोजनमस्ति । शब्दस्य बोध्यत्वे तन्नास्ति । अतश्शब्दस्य बोध्यत्वं न युक्तम् । यथा व्युत्पादनाय पर्यायशब्दप्रयोगो लोके दृश्यते, तथा प्रकृते द्वयोर्बोधकत्वेऽपि सह प्रयोग उपपद्यते ।

अन्विताभिधानस्यापि न विरोधः । प्रथममर्थस्याभिधानं नास्ति । अपि तु प्रत्येकमर्थानां स्मरणमात्रम् । अथ आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतादिपरामर्शः । अनन्तरमेव संहतानां पदानां परस्परस्मारितार्थान्वितस्वार्थाभिधायकत्वम् । यथा—सिद्धपरत्वे विशेष्यपदं विशेषणपदस्मारितार्थान्वितस्वार्थाभिधायि, विशेषणपदं विशेष्यपदस्मारितार्थान्वितस्वार्थाभिधायि; एवं कार्यपरत्वे कारकपदं क्रियान्वितस्वार्थाभिधायकम्, क्रियापदं कारकान्वितस्वार्थाभिधायकमिति विभाग इति—

इति सिद्धार्थव्युत्पत्तिसमर्थनवादः ॥

अथ स्वतः प्रामाण्यवर्णनवादे द्वितीये वेदस्य स्वतःप्रामाण्यसिद्ध्यर्थं कुमारिलमतानुसारेण ज्ञानानां स्वतःप्रामाण्यं निर्णीयते । अत्र मुख्यः पूर्वपक्षी नैयायिकः । अस्यायमाशयः—

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां गुणाधीनं प्रामाण्यं दोषाधीनमप्रामाण्यञ्च संवादिविसंवादिप्रवृत्तिभ्यामनुमीयते इति न तयोरुत्पत्तौ ज्ञप्तौ वा स्वतस्त्वम् । विषयप्रकाशकत्वं परं स्वभावः । तत्तु शिंशुपापलाशादिषु वृक्षत्वमिव प्रमाणाप्रमाणयोः साधारणम् । शिंशुपात्व-

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

पलाशत्वादिवत् प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्येऽसाधारणे। शिंशुपायां पलाशत्वस्य, पलाशे शिंशुपात्वस्य च निवृत्तावपि वृक्षत्वानिवृत्त्या यथा शिंशुपात्वाद्यपेक्षया वृक्षत्वमतिरिक्तस्सामान्यधर्मस्तद्वदेव प्रमाणज्ञानेऽप्रामाण्यस्य, अप्रमाणज्ञाने प्रामाण्यस्य च, निवृत्तावप्यर्थपरिच्छेदकत्वरूपस्य ज्ञानत्वस्यानिवृत्तेरनधिगताबाधितार्थप्रकाशकत्वरूपप्रामाण्यात् केवलार्थप्रकाशकत्वरूपं ज्ञानत्वमतिरिक्तं सामान्यधर्म इति निश्चीयते। प्रामाण्यनिश्चयश्च गुणज्ञानात्, संवादज्ञानात्, अर्थक्रियाकारित्वज्ञानाद्वा; न तु स्वतः। अप्रामाण्यनिश्चयस्तु दोषज्ञानात्। स्वतः प्रामाण्यवादिमते प्रामाण्यस्य व्यवसायात्मकज्ञानग्राहकेणानुमानेनैव व्यवसायवद्भानाङ्गीकारेण प्रामाण्यसंशयो न स्यात्; व्यवसायनिश्चयस्यैव प्रामाण्यनिश्चयरूपत्वात्। वेदस्थलेऽपि गुणात्प्रामाण्यस्योत्पत्तिः। अप्रामाण्यहेतोर्वक्तृदोषस्याभावान्नाप्रामाण्यं शङ्कास्पदमपि। अतः प्रमा ज्ञानहेत्वतिरिक्तहेत्वधीना, कार्यत्वे सति तद्विशेषत्वात्; अप्रमावत् इति॥

राद्धान्तस्तु—ज्ञानानां प्रामाण्यं स्वत एव, न तु गुणात्। तथा हि—विशेषणविशेष्यतदुभयसम्बन्धात्मकं यथावस्थितार्थप्रकाशकत्वमेव प्रामाण्यम्। तच्च 'अयं घटः' इति प्रमास्थल इव 'इदं रजतम्' इति भ्रमस्थलेऽपीदमाद्यंशे वर्तते। अतो बहेर्दाहकत्वमिव स्वाभाविकं तत्। ईदृशं प्रामाण्यमेव ज्ञानत्वम्; न त्वतिरिक्तम्। अतिरिक्तत्वेऽपि ज्ञानसामान्यवृत्त्येव प्रामाण्यं ज्ञानत्वव्यञ्जकम्। यथा गोसामान्यवृत्त्येव सास्नापुच्छकर्णशृङ्गादिसंस्थानं गोत्वव्यञ्जकम्; यथा वैतेषामन्यतमापायेऽपि शेषं संस्थानं गोत्वं व्यञ्जयति, तथा भ्रमस्थले विशेषणविशेष्ययोस्संसर्गाभावेऽपि शेषांशेन ज्ञानत्वव्यक्तौ न दोषः। अतो ज्ञानत्वव्यञ्जकत्वात्प्रामाण्यस्य गोत्वव्यञ्जकसंस्थानस्येव साधारणत्वमुपपद्यते। प्रामाण्ये ज्ञानत्वव्यञ्जकताया अनभ्युपगमे ज्ञानत्व एव मानाभावः। निस्स्वभावत्वं ज्ञानस्य प्रसज्येत।

शिंशुपापलाशादिविशेषेषु वृक्षत्वमिव प्रमाणाप्रमाणसाधारणं ज्ञानत्वम्। तदवान्तरधर्मौ प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे इति वक्तुं न शक्यते। दृष्टान्ते हि शाखास्कन्धादिसामान्यरूपं तत्तदसाधारणं पर्णस्पर्शादिभेदवत्त्वञ्चेति रूपद्वयमुपलभ्यते। तत्र सामान्यरूपेण

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

शाखादिनाा वृक्षत्वं, असाधारणरूपेण पर्णादिना शिंशुपात्वादिकञ्चाभिव्यज्यताम् । ज्ञाने तु ज्ञानत्वव्यञ्जकसामान्याकारातिरेकेण प्रमाणत्वव्यञ्जकाकारविशेषो नोपलभ्यते । अतो ज्ञानत्वप्रमाणत्वयोस्सामान्यविशेषरूपत्वं नाभ्युपगन्तुं क्षमम् ।

प्रामाण्यग्रहोऽपि न गुणज्ञानादिना । अपि तु स्वत एव । ज्ञानेन हि विषये ज्ञाततारूयो धर्म उत्पाद्यते । स एवार्थप्रकाश इत्युच्यते । तज्जनकत्वमेव ज्ञानस्यार्थप्रकाशकत्वरूपं प्रामाण्यम् । अनया कार्यभूतया ज्ञाततया कारणभूतं ज्ञानमनुमीयते । ज्ञाततालिङ्गकानुमानेनैव व्यवसायगतप्रामाण्यस्यापि ग्रहः । व्यवसायविषयकज्ञानग्राह्यत्वमेव स्वतो ग्राह्यत्वं प्रामाण्यस्य । एवमपि प्रामाण्यसंशयस्य न विरोधः । प्रामाण्यस्य ह्यपवादोऽप्रामाण्यम् । तच्छङ्कया प्रामाण्यसंशयः । अपवादशङ्काकळङ्करहितमेव प्रामाण्यज्ञानं प्रामाण्यसंशयविरोधि ; न तु प्रामाण्यज्ञानमात्रम् । अप्रामाण्ये निरस्ते चौत्सर्गिकं प्रामाण्यमवतिष्ठते ; यथा बीजस्याङ्कुरोत्पादनसामर्थ्यं स्वाभाविकं निश्चितमप्यग्निसंसर्गादिदोषसंशयात्संशयविषयो भवति ; दोषसंशये निरस्ते च स्वाभाविकसामर्थ्यनिश्चयः । नैतावता बीजस्य अङ्कुरोत्पादनसामर्थ्यस्य स्वभाविकत्वमपैति ; तद्वदिहापि । अत उदाहृतमनुमानं हेत्वसिद्धयादिदोषग्रस्तमिति ॥

इति स्वतःप्रामाण्यवर्णनवादो द्वितीयः ॥

अथ तृतीये ख्यातिनिरूपणवादे तार्किकाभिमता अन्यथाख्यातिः परमसिद्धान्तभूतयथार्थख्यातिश्च समर्थ्यते । पूर्वपक्षिणो गुरुमतानुसारिणः, अनिर्वचनीयख्यातिवादिनोऽद्वैतिनश्च । तत्र गुरुमतानुसारिणामयमाशयः—शुक्तिं दृष्ट्वा इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानमन्यथाख्यातिरिति न वक्तुं शक्यते ; तत्र रजतेन सहेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाभावात् । किन्तु इदमिति पुरोवर्तिविषयकानुभवः । रजतमिति च पूर्वानुभूतरजतविषयकस्मृतिमात्रम् । स्मृतित्वे देशान्तरोल्लेखेन तत्र रजतमिति हि ज्ञानाकारेण भवितव्यमिति नाशङ्कनीयम् : दोषव-

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

शादेशान्तरानुल्लेखोपपत्तेः। रजतत्वस्य पुरोवर्तिभास्वरद्रव्यनिष्ठतया भानाभावेऽपि स्मर्यमाणरजतभेदाग्रहात्प्रवृत्त्युपपत्तिरिति। अत्रान्यथाख्यातिवादिनः—

'वादिनां विप्रतिपत्तेर्बाधाद्व्यवहारात्तु मोक्षितः।
स्वारस्याच्चान्यथाख्यातिः प्रसिद्धा नापनीयताम्॥'

इति वदन्ति। तथा हि—१. कश्चित् शब्दो नित्य इति वदति, अन्यश्च अनित्य इति। तयोरन्यतरोऽन्यथा गृह्णातीति वक्तव्यम्। तत्रापि ज्ञानद्वयाभ्युपगमेऽधिकरणभेदेन नित्यत्वानित्यत्वयोर्विरोधाभावाद्विवादविलयप्रसङ्गः। अतो वादिनां विवादकार्यकारणतयान्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिः।

२. एवं इदं रजतमिति शुक्तिकां रजतमित्यध्यस्य समनन्तरं स एव सम्पन्नपरिशुद्धसामग्रीको नेदं रजतमिति जानाति। तत्र नेदं रजतमिति बाधकज्ञानमन्यथाख्यातिरूपशुक्तिकारजतज्ञानस्य बाध्यस्याभावे न बाधकं भवति। तस्माद्बाध्यबाधकाभावान्यथानुपपत्त्या अन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिः।

३. एवं व्यवहारात्—स च व्यवहारो भेदाग्रहे स्वरूपज्ञानमात्रेण न भवितुमर्हति। नेयं शुक्तिरिति शुक्तिस्फुरणदशायामपि शुक्तिभेदाग्रहस्य स्वरूपज्ञानस्य चाङ्गीकार्यत्वात्। तत्र शुक्तौ शुक्तिभेदग्रहेऽन्यथाख्यातिस्वीकारापत्तेः। अतश्शुक्तिभेदाग्रहात् नेयं शुक्तिरिति ज्ञानदशायामपि शुक्तिव्यवहारोदयप्रसङ्गः। अतो व्यवहारान्यथानुपपत्त्या अन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिः।

४. एवं भ्रान्तिशब्दो ज्ञानविशेषगोचरो भेदाग्रहेऽभावरूपे न भवति। अन्यथा सुषुप्तावपि भ्रान्तिशब्दः प्रयुज्येत। मिथ्याज्ञानं भ्रान्तिरिति च पर्यायौ। अतोऽप्यन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिः।

५. स्वारस्याच्च—शुक्तिं दृष्ट्वा इदं रजतमिति मे मतिरासीदिति विशिष्टज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षमवसीयते। नत्वसंसर्गो नानुभूत इति। असंसर्गाग्रहपक्षे तथैव किल ज्ञानाकारेण भाव्यम्। तस्माल्लोकप्रमितिस्वारस्याच्चान्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिरिति।

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

अनिर्वचनीयख्यातिवादिनस्त्वेवमाहुः। स्वयंप्रकाशा ज्ञप्तिरेव परमार्थः। तस्या निर्धर्मकत्वादर्थेन सह विषयविषयिभावो नोपपद्यते। अर्थश्च सदसदनिर्वचनीयः। असच्चेन्न प्रतीयेत, सच्चेन्न बाध्येत। अतः ख्यातिबाधान्यथानुपपत्त्या अनिर्वचनीयत्वरूपं मिथ्यात्वमर्थस्य। ज्ञानज्ञेययोरध्यासाधिकरणत्वव्यतिरेकेण न सम्बन्धः कश्चिदपीति।

अत्र सिद्धान्तः—पारोक्ष्यापारोक्ष्यानुभवत्वस्मृतित्वादिधर्माणामुपलब्धेर्ज्ञानं न निर्धर्मकम्। अतो विषयविषयिभावोपपत्तिः। प्रतीत्या सत्त्वं बाधेनासत्त्वञ्चेति संभवात्, नार्थस्यानिर्वचनीयत्वसिद्धिः। अर्थस्य पारमार्थ्यं विना रूपान्तरं नास्ति। उत्पत्तिमत्त्वादर्थक्रियाकारित्वाच्च सत्यत्वम्। विश्वमपि पञ्चीकृतभूतारब्धम्। अतः सर्वत्र सर्वं यथासंभवं विद्यते। शुक्तावपि रजतांशो मनाग्विद्यते। शुक्त्यंशस्तु तत्र भूयान्। तत्र शुक्तिं दृष्ट्वा इदं रजतमिति शुक्तिभूयस्त्ववैकल्येन ग्रहः। नेदं रजतमिति तु शुक्तिभूयस्त्वसाकल्येन ग्रहः। तत्र नेदं रजतमिति शुक्तिभूयस्त्वे गृहीते, इदं रजतमिति शुक्तिभूयस्त्ववैकल्यज्ञानेन जायमाना प्रवृत्तिर्बाध्यते। बाध्यप्रवृत्तिकत्वमेव इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानस्य नेदं रजतमिति ज्ञानेन बाध्यत्वं नाम। तस्मात्सर्वं ज्ञानं यथार्थमिति।

इति ख्यातिनिरूपणवादस्तृतीयः॥

चतुर्थे स्वयंप्रकाशवादे भाट्टमुरारिमिश्रनैयायिकानां मतं निरस्य ज्ञानानां स्वयंप्रकाशत्वं समर्थ्यते। तत्र भाट्टाः—ज्ञानमतीन्द्रियम्। अयं घट इति ज्ञानेन विषये घटे ज्ञाततारूयः कश्चिद्धर्म उत्पाद्यते। स एव प्रकाश इत्युच्यते। तेन कार्यभूतेन प्रकाशेन कारणभूतं ज्ञानमनुमीयते। अतो ज्ञाततालिङ्गकानुमितिगम्यत्वाज्ज्ञानस्य न स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमिति वदन्ति।

मिश्रादीनामयमाशयः—यथा वा चक्षुश्शक्तिविशेषाच्चाक्षुषज्ञाने विशेषमभ्युपेत्य रूपादावेव ज्ञाततारूयधर्मश्चाक्षुषज्ञानेनोत्पाद्यत इत्युच्यते; न तु सत्यपि संयुक्तसमवा-

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

यादिसन्निकर्षे गन्धादौ; तथैव चाक्षुषज्ञानस्वभावादेव नियतविषयकत्वोपपत्तेस्तदर्थमर्थगततया ज्ञाततारूप्यधर्मकल्पने मानाभावः। अतो ज्ञाततायां एवाप्रामाणिकत्वान्न ज्ञाततालिङ्गकानुमितिगम्यो व्यवसायः। न वा स्वयंप्रकाशः। ज्ञानस्य यस्मिन्नर्थे प्रत्यासत्तिरस्ति, तस्यैव खलु प्रकाशो भवितुमर्हति ज्ञानम्; यथा घटेन प्रत्यासन्नं घटज्ञानमित्युच्यते। न हि स्वस्य स्वयमेव विषयः। तथा सति प्रत्यक्षे विषयस्य कारणतया स्वस्य स्वजन्यत्वापत्तिः। अतो घटमहं जानामीत्याद्यनुव्यवसायग्राह्य एवेति।

सिद्धान्तस्तु—ज्ञानं स्वयंप्रकाशमेव। यथा दीपस्यान्धकारनिरसनेन घटादीनां हानादिव्यवहारकारित्वेऽपि स्वस्य हानादिव्यवहारे न दीपान्तरापेक्षा, तद्वज्ज्ञानं घटादौ व्यवहारजनने येन रूपेणोपकरोति तथा स्वात्मनि व्यवहारजननेऽन्यं प्रकाशं नापेक्षत इति स्वयंप्रकाशमुच्यते। ज्ञानस्य हि घटादिषु वर्तमानेषु संयोगद्वारको योग्यतालक्षणः कार्यकल्प्यः; अवर्तमानेषु तेषु वर्तमानावस्थद्रव्यसंयोगद्वारको योग्यतालक्षण एव; तदाश्रितेषु संयोगाश्रितत्वं च संबन्धोऽङ्गीक्रियते। ज्ञानस्य प्रसरणविभुत्वादिप्रतिपादकशास्त्राद्द्रव्यत्वं संयोगश्चाभ्युपगम्यते। इत्थञ्च तादृशसंबन्धमन्तरेणैव स्वस्मिन् व्यवहारहेतुर्ज्ञानमिति स्वप्रकाशत्वमुपपद्यते। ज्ञानं अनन्याधीनप्रकाशम्, अर्थप्रकाशकत्वात्, दीपवत्, इत्यनुमानेनापि स्वप्रकाशत्वसिद्धिरिति।

इति स्वयंप्रकाशवादश्चतुर्थः॥

अथ पञ्चमे ईश्वरानुमानभङ्गवादे नैयायिकाभिमतमीश्वरानुमानं व्युदस्यते। तन्निरासाभावे हि शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं न प्रतितिष्ठति। तथाहि—ईश्वरस्वरूपस्यानुमानिकत्वे, न शास्त्रस्य तस्मिन्नंशे प्रामाण्यं सिद्ध्यति; 'अप्राप्ते शास्त्रमर्थवत्' इति न्यायात्। ईश्वरस्य परिजनस्थानादिकमनुमानाप्रतिपन्नमिति तदंशे शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यमित्यपि न वक्तुं शक्यम्। ईश्वरस्यातिशयाधानार्थं हि परिजनादिकम्। तस्य परिजनादिभिराधेयातिशयत्वे ईश्वरत्वायोग इति धर्मिग्राहकतयोपजीव्यभूतेनानुमानेन तस्य बाधितत्वात्। एवमुपादानत्वांशेऽपि न तत्प्रामाण्यम्। सशरीरस्योपादानत्वे संसारित्वम्। अशरीरस्य तथात्वे शरीरद्वारा उपादान-

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

त्वायोगः इत्यादिरीत्या सर्व एव वेदान्ता ईश्वरस्य परिजनस्थानोपादनत्वादिप्रतिपादनपरा अनुमानोपजीविनो बाधिता भवेयुः । अतश्शास्त्रप्रामाण्यसिद्ध्यर्थमीश्वरानुमानं निरस्यते ।

नैयायिकाः खल्वेवमाहुः—क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वात्, घटवत् इत्यनुमानेनास्मदादीनां क्षित्यादिकर्तृत्वस्य बाधितत्वात्तत्कर्तृतया ईश्वरस्य सिद्धिः । क्षित्यादीनां कार्यत्वं तावत् प्रत्यक्षेणैव प्रतिपन्नम् । क्षित्यादिकं कार्यं सावयवत्त्वात्, घटवदित्यनुमानेनापि तेषां कार्यत्वं सिद्धम् । न च सकर्तृकस्य सर्वस्य शक्यक्रियत्वेन साध्यव्यापकत्वात्, कार्यस्य च क्षित्यादेरशक्यक्रियत्वेन साधनाव्यापकत्वाच्च, शक्यक्रियत्वमत्रानुमान उपाधिरिति शङ्कनीयम्; तत्तत्कार्यशक्तेरप्रत्यक्षायाः कार्यत्वहेतुनैवानुमेयत्वेन कार्यत्वव्यापकत्वेन साधनाव्यापकत्वाभावात् । अतो निर्दुष्टमिदमनुमानमिति ।

सिद्धान्तस्तु—सकर्तृकमित्यत्र कर्तृशब्देन यत्नादिव्यापारनिरपेक्षकेवलात्मनो विवक्षणे दृष्टान्ते घटादौ यत्नादिनिरपेक्षकर्तृजन्यत्वासिद्धिः; पक्षे तादृशसकर्तृकत्वस्य बाधः; यत्नवदीश्वरस्यानुमानेनासिद्धिश्च । यदि ज्ञानादिपरिकररहितकेवलयत्नवानात्मा कर्तृशब्देन विवक्षितः, तदापि किं यत्नस्य यत्नाधिष्ठेयवस्तुक्रियाद्वारा कार्यहेतुत्वम्? उत स्वरूपतइति विकल्पे, स्वरूपतः इति पक्षे पूर्ववदेव दोषाः; यत्ने सत्यपि क्रियां विना घटादिकार्यादर्शनेन स्वरूपतः यत्नपूर्वकत्वस्य दृष्टान्तेऽभावात् । अतः क्रियाद्वारा कार्यहेतुत्वमिति प्रथमकल्पे, कार्यसामान्यस्य स्वोपयोगिक्रियाद्वारा यत्नपूर्वकत्वमिति नियमादग्न्यादीनामूर्ध्वगमनादेरदृष्टैककारणकत्वमिति सिद्धान्तव्याहतिः परेषाम् । उक्तं हि 'अग्नेरूर्ध्वज्वलनं वायोस्तिर्यगमनमणुमनसोश्चाद्यं कर्मेत्यदृष्टकारितानि' इति ।

अपि च विश्वोपादानक्रियाहेतुप्रयत्नवत्पूर्वकत्वसाधनेऽपि उक्तप्रयत्नवतस्सर्वज्ञत्वे प्रमाणं नास्ति । लोके चेतनस्यैव यत्नो दृष्ट इति तस्य चैतन्यमात्रकल्पनैव हि लघीयसी; न तु तस्य चैतन्यस्य सर्वविषयकत्वमेतावता सिद्ध्यति । यत्नस्य विषयव्यवस्थाया ज्ञानाधीनत्वात् सर्वविषयज्ञानं विना सर्वविषयकत्वं यत्नस्य न सेत्स्यतीति च न सुवचम् । यथा सुषुप्तावदृष्टादेव यत्नस्य विषयव्यवस्था तद्वज्ज्ञानं विनापि तदुपपत्तेः । अतः उक्तपक्षेऽपि विवक्षितेश्वरासिद्धिः ।

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

ज्ञानादिपरिकरसहितयत्नवत्पूर्वकत्वस्य सकर्तृकमित्यनेन विवक्षणेऽप्युक्तरीत्या ज्ञानादेर्यत्नं प्रत्यनुपकारकत्वात्साध्याप्रसिद्धिः। ज्ञानयत्नयोस्साहित्यदर्शनमात्रेण ज्ञानसाधनेऽविशेषाद्देहादिकमप्यङ्गीकार्यं स्यात्।

किञ्च क्षित्यादिकं शरीरिकर्तृकम्, अनित्यज्ञानवत्कर्तृकम्, अस्मदादिकर्तृकम्, असर्वज्ञकर्तृकम्, सकर्तृकत्वाद्घटवदिति प्रत्यनुमानपराहतञ्चैतदनुमानमिति।

इति ईश्वरानुमानभङ्गवादः पञ्चमः

षष्ठे देहाद्यतिरिक्तात्मयाथात्म्यवादे प्राधान्येन चार्वाकमतमद्वैतिमतञ्च निरस्य देहेन्द्रियमनःप्राणबुद्धिविलक्षणः, परमात्मनः परस्परञ्च भिन्नः, ज्ञाता, कर्ता, अहम्प्रत्ययवेद्यः जीवात्मेति समर्थ्यते। तत्र चार्वाकस्यायं भावः—अहम्प्रत्ययगोचरस्यात्मत्वमिति तावदविवादम्। अतः देवोऽहं मनुष्योऽहं इति प्रतीतिबलाद्देहस्यैवात्मत्वम्। न हि कश्चित् चक्षुरहं श्रोत्रमहमिति प्रत्येति। अत इन्द्रियाणामनात्मत्वमवसीयते। मनसस्तु ज्ञानकरणत्वमेवेति न तत्कर्तृत्वमिति नात्मत्वम्। नापि प्राणस्यात्मत्वम्; शरीरे निष्क्रिये सति प्राणे सक्रियेऽपि अहं निष्क्रिय इति प्रतीतेरनुभवसिद्धाया अनुपपत्तेः। बुद्धेस्तु ज्ञाधात्वर्थत्वेन साध्यरूपत्वात् आत्मनश्च सिद्धत्वान्न तथात्वम्। अतो देह एवात्मा। मम शरीरमिति व्यतिरेकधीस्तु भवन्मते ममात्मेतिवदौपचारिकी। पृथिव्यादिभूतेषु चैतन्यानुपलम्भेऽपि शरीराकारेण परिणतेषु तेषु यथादर्शनं चैतन्याङ्गीकारे बाधकाभावः। बाल्ययुवत्वाद्यवस्थाभेदेऽपि स एवायमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलाद्देहस्याभिन्नतया बाल्येऽनुभूतस्य युवत्वादौ प्रतिसन्धानोपपत्तिरिति।

अद्वैतिनस्त्वेवमाहुः—देहातिरिक्तः प्रत्यगर्थ एवात्मा न ज्ञाता अहमर्थः। प्रत्यक्त्वञ्च स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वम्। तत्संविद एव। अतस्संविदेवात्मा। संविदो व्यतिरिच्यमानं परागर्थ एव। अत आत्मनो ज्ञातृत्वाङ्गीकारे संविदपरपर्यायज्ञानव्यतिरेकस्याभ्युपेयत्वात्परागर्थ-

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.

Funding: Tattva Heritage Foundation,Kolkata. Digitization: eGangotri.

त्वापत्तेः। प्रत्यक्तत्वस्य संविद्रूपत्व एव निर्वाहात् संविद्रूप एव सः; न तु ज्ञानाश्रय इति।

राद्धान्तस्तु—चार्वाकाभिमतदेहात्मवादो न युज्यते। देहस्यावयवसङ्घातरूपत्वेऽतिरेकेऽपि वावयवेषु चैतन्यमवश्यमङ्गीकार्यम्। अतिरेकवादेऽवयविविशेषगुणानां अवयवविशेषगुणैरेवोत्पादाभ्युपगमात्। सङ्घातरूपत्वेऽपि अवयवानाञ्चैतन्यस्य प्रत्येकमभावे देहे चैतन्यानुपपत्तिः। अतोऽवयवेषु चैतन्यमङ्गीक्रियते इत्यपि न वक्तुं शक्यम्; अवयवानामहमिति प्रतीतिगोचरत्वाभावात्। न हि कश्चिदहं पाणिः अहं पाद इति प्रतिपद्यते। अतोऽहंत्वस्य तेष्वभावाच्चैतन्यस्याप्यभावः। पादे मे सुखमित्याद्युपलम्भात्सुखादेः पादादिवृत्तितया तत्समानाधिकरणं चैतन्यमपि पादादीनामित्यपि न वाच्यम्, मे सुखमिति प्रतीतिबलादहमर्थस्यैव सुखित्वाद्यभ्युपगमावश्यकत्वात् पादादेरनहमर्थस्य तदयोगात्। पादे सुखमित्यादिः प्रत्ययस्तु अहमर्थनिष्ठमेव सुखादिकं प्रति पादादेरवच्छेदकतयोपपद्यते।

किञ्च एकस्यावयवस्य चैतन्ये तदवयवनाशे चैतन्याभावप्रसङ्गः। सर्वेषां प्रत्येकं तथात्वे स्वप्रयोजनापेक्षिप्वितरपराङ्मुखेषु मिथस्साभ्यसूयेषु च हस्तपादादिष्ववयवेषु एकग्रामवासिषु पुरुषेष्विव महान्विवादः स्यात्। न हि चेतनस्स्वप्रयोजनमपहायार्थान्तरे प्रयतते।

चूर्णहरिद्रासंयोगजरागवत् पृथिव्यादिषु भूतेषु प्रत्येकमविद्यमानमपि चैतन्यं तत्सङ्घातात्मके शरीरे जायतामित्यनुपपन्नम्। दृष्टान्तेऽपि पाकविशेषेणावयविगुणसजातीयगुणस्य तत्तदवयवेषूत्पत्तेरभ्युपगमात्। अतोऽवयवेष्वविद्यमानश्चैतन्यमवयविनि सम्पद्यतामिति सकलप्रमाणतर्कविरुद्धम्।

किञ्च बालादेस्तन्यपानादाविष्टसाधनत्वस्मरणात्प्रवृत्तिरेष्टव्या। इदानीं तदनुभवस्याभावात्। तच्च स्मरणं पूर्वानुभवजन्यसंस्कारोन्मेषवशादुत्पद्यत इत्यास्थेयम्। संस्कारोन्मेषकारणञ्चादृष्टम्। तच्चादृष्टं अनुभवः संस्कारश्चास्मिन् देहे बालादेर्न सम्भवतीत्यदृष्टाद्याधारः देहातिरिक्तो नित्य आत्मा सिद्ध्यति। अत एव प्रेक्षावतां पार-

CC-0. Bhagavad Ramanuja National Research Institute, Melukote Collection.